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Dynamic Partnership  
A Constructivist Discourse Analysis of the 
Contemporary American Understanding of the U.S.-
Turkish Relationship 
U R S U L A  E L IN O R  M O F F I T T  
 
In dieser Masterarbeit wird eine konstruktivistische Diskursanalyse durchgeführt um die These zu unterstüt-
zen, dass eine grundlegende Umgestaltung im amerikanischen Verständnis der türkisch-amerikanischen Be-
ziehung unter Präsident Obama im zuge eines übergeordneten Wandels der amerikanischen Außenpolitik 
stattgefunden hat. Anhand einer analytischen Betrachtung diverser hochrangiger Diskurse und Präsidenten-
Reden seit der Ära Ronald Reagans versucht diese Arbeit den chronologischen Weg der amerikanischen Au-
ßenpolitik anhand politischer Sprache, politischem Handeln und struktureller Veränderung, unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Türkei, aufzuzeigen. Die Formbarkeit dieser Beziehung soll mittels Anwendung der 
konstruktivistischen Theorie besonders hervorgehoben werden. Zudem wird der Frage nachgegangen, wie 
sich das Verständnis amerikanischer Führungspolitiker in Bezug auf ihre Rolle in der Welt und der Beziehung 
zur Türkei, abseits des strikten Kurs des Realismus, in den letzten Jahrzehnten verändert hat. 
 
Stichworte: Konstruktivismus, Diskursanalyse, Poststrukturalismus, amerikanische Außenpolitik, U.S.-
türkische Beziehungen, Präsidentenreden, Obama, Erdogan 
 
Using a constructivist discourse analysis, this thesis argues that there has been a fundamental shift in the 
American understanding of the U.S.-Turkish relationship under President Obama, situated within a broader 
change in the nature of American foreign policy making. By analyzing presidential and other high-level dis-
course beginning in the Reagan era, this thesis examines the chronological path of American foreign policy, 
specifically in relation to Turkey, delving into political language, actions, and structural changes. By engaging 
constructivist theory, this thesis highlights the fluid nature of relations, endeavoring to answer the underly-
ing question of how the high-level understanding of the U.S. role in world affairs generally, and in relation to 
Turkey specifically, has moved beyond a strict realist foundation over the past decades. 
 
Keywords: Constructivism, discourse analysis, post-structuralism, American foreign policy, U.S.-Turkish 
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1. Introduction 
In the spring of 2009, newly elected American President Barack Obama made a stop in 
Turkey during his first official visit overseas.  President Obama addressed the Grand 
National Assembly in Ankara, opening his speech by stating: 
“Some people have asked me if I chose to continue my travels to Ankara and Istanbul 
to send a message to the world. And my answer is simple: Evet -- yes.  Turkey is a 
critical ally. Turkey is an important part of Europe. And Turkey and the United States 
must stand together -- and work together -- to overcome the challenges of our time.” 
(Obama 2009). 
With this succinct yet significant introductory statement, President Obama laid the 
foundation for a new chapter within the American-Turkish partnership.  By choosing to 
publicly grant such weight to this alliance through both his actions and words, Obama 
underscored Turkey’s role as a powerful nation worthy of explicit notice.  He also 
emphasized its position within Europe at a time of stalled European Union (EU) 
accession talks, thereby setting the United States (U.S.) apart from nations such as 
France and Germany, who acted as key players in slowing the negotiations.  
Additionally, Obama stressed that not only should the United States and Turkey “stand 
together,” but they should also “work together,” thus differentiating between tacit 
alliance and active partnership, implicitly heightening the importance of the Turkish 
side of the American-Turkish relationship.  This brief excerpt displays the great 
significance that even singular acts of speech can hold in terms of relations between 
states, wherein a shift in rhetoric can affect the development of overall discourse, 
which includes not only speech but also actions.   
Such an interpretation of the power of discourse embraces a constructivist view of 
international relations, which espouses an intersubjective relationship between actors 
and structures within and across societies, meaning that the understanding of self, 
other, and the relations between the two are continually being formed and reformed by 
the actions and speech acts of individuals and institutions (Klotz/ Lynch 2007). When 
embarking on a constructivist reading of inter-state alliances, discourse can be 
analyzed, offering an important tool in understanding the ever-changing nature of 
relations, which are viewed as fluid, malleable, and situationally contingent.  Following 
this logic, material structures such as treaties, international organizations, or even 




GET MA WP 07/2014 
currency, gain their significance only via shared frameworks of meaning, reinforced by 
the actions and discourse of actors (Griffiths 2007: 60).  According to such an 
interpretation, there can never be a static relationship, as even what seems to be an 
accepted ongoing alliance must in fact be kept that way by the repeated reconstruction 
of norms and conditions maintaining the status of the liaison.   
This thesis will endeavor to examine the contemporary American understanding of the 
U.S.-Turkish partnership through such a constructivist lens, highlighting the fluidity of 
the relationship and attempting to reconstruct the path the alliance has taken in the 
recent past in order to situate it within a current geo-political context.  Moreover, the 
American understanding of the alliance with Turkey will be situated within an analysis 
of broader American foreign policy, as it is hypothesized that shifts in wider 
understandings of America’s role in the world are linked to and prompt changes in the 
perception of Turkey as an ally. The thesis will focus predominantly on the discourse 
offered by American political leaders, most notably presidents, but will also examine 
that of Turkish political actors as well as the secondary literature presented by scholars 
in the field.  Corresponding changes in material relations will also be explored in order 
to critically examine the larger context of the relationship, including the status of trade 
relations, levels of investment, bi-lateral agreements, and other factors that may 
influence the nature of the partnership.   
Through such analysis, the thesis will strive to address the question of whether or not 
there has been a marked change within the American understanding of its relationship 
with Turkey since the Cold War period, focusing specifically on the years since 2002, 
when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was first elected in Turkey, and most 
significantly since President Obama was elected in 2008 and the beginning of the Arab 
Spring in 2011. These historical landmarks will act as points of reference within the 
analysis, offering concrete chronological context to the thesis while also contributing a 
basis for an examination of structural change. Additionally, within this basic time 
frame, major events and other regional relationships will be explored, including the 
first Gulf War, the September 11th attacks in the U.S., the American-led invasions of 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Turkey’s relationship with nations such as Israel, Iran, and the 
island of Cyprus, and the presence of the Kurdish separatist group known as the PKK.  
Examining these events and other interstate relations will help to situate the American 
foreign policy outlook in general, thereby making more clear the related changes 
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within the U.S.-Turkish relationship. The body of the thesis will be formulated following 
chronological order, as such a design seems most suitable for this particular research.  
Based on a constructivist reading of international relations, it is assumed that the 
American understanding of U.S.-Turkish relations at any given time has greatly 
influenced the nature of actions taken in relation to Turkey, thereby affecting 
continued discourse and the ongoing relationship.  Following this structure, the 
independent variables within this analysis are the regional and world events affecting 
the relationship, and the dependent variables are the ensuing discourse that shapes 
the ongoing understanding of the relationship itself. 
Furthermore, this thesis will work to analyze not only the changing nature of the 
American-Turkish partnership, but also to elucidate the American understanding of 
Turkey as a “model nation” for the Middle East, using textual analysis as well as a 
thorough examination of Turkey’s ties to the U.S. and other nations, therewith gaining 
a stronger framework for how this title reflects the contemporary nature of American 
foreign policy in the region. In order to understand why the U.S. has promoted Turkey 
as a model, the thesis will also include an examination of changes in Turkish domestic 
and foreign policy over the past decades, investigating in particular how these changes 
have affected the U.S.-Turkish partnership. It is hypothesized that a discursive shift 
concerning the nature of the American relationship with Turkey will be evident in the 
years following the break up of the Soviet Union as well as between Presidents Bush 
and Obama, but that a deeper change in underlying American strategy will in fact only 
be recognizable within very recent discourse, specifically as a result of the election of 
Barack Obama, which was then heightened by the events of the Arab Spring.  This 
shift will be situated within a deeper underlying change in the high level perception of 
America and its role in the world, meaning that although there were concrete changes 
in the U.S. relationship with Turkey during and after the Cold War, it is hypothesized 
that only Obama’s understanding of and approach to global politics has in turn 
prompted a more fundamental shift in U.S.-Turkish relations.  Following on this 
hypothesized change in foreign policy strategy, this thesis will also endeavor to explore 
the hypothesis that the U.S. no longer expects nor is seeking a tacit partner in Turkey, 
but instead is attempting to cultivate an active alliance. 
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2. Theory and methods 
2.1 Constructivism and Discourse Analysis  
Although it can be argued that the field of international relations (IR) has existed in 
some form for millennia, with theorists from Thucydides to Machiavelli, Locke, Hobbes, 
and Marx laying out philosophies and models that continue to shape scholars’ 
understandings of humans and structures, the discipline of IR as a field specifically 
devoted to the analysis of modern states arose only in the 20th century.  Amidst the 
harsh aftermath of two world wars, the increasingly bi-polar world propagated systems 
of analysis based largely on state-centered arguments, with the assumption that the 
desire for power was inherent to the state of human nature, thus leading to an 
inevitable and continuous struggle for supremacy among nations (Griffiths 2007: 11–
12). Theorists such as Hans Morgenthau in the first decades after WWII, and later 
Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, shaped the field of IR with their focus on the 
nature and origin of conflict between states.  While there exist certain distinctions 
between the different theorists’ arguments and interpretations, the perceived 
inevitability of ongoing inter-state power struggles based on the self-interested choices 
of actors attempting to reign in the natural anarchy of the world bring all of them 
together under the broad headings of realism and neorealism.  Moreover, a general 
assumption that all actors will behave in a similar power-mongering fashion given 
similar circumstances, dubbed rational actor theory, was an underlying postulation 
within realist philosophy, with any deviation from this notion seen as irrational 
(Griffiths 2007: 12). 
By the 1980s, as relations were changing between states and the Cold War came to an 
abrupt end, the discipline of IR underwent a critical re-examination, with numerous 
scholars questioning the basic realist idea that there can be objectivity and pure 
rationalism within global politics.  Theorists began arguing that realist and neorealist 
scholarship was in fact naturalizing existing power structures, taking as given 
something that is, in fact, constructed (Griffiths 2007: 61).  The ensuing debate 
focused on the ideas of so-called rationalists versus critical theorists.  Realists and 
neorealists fall under the category of rationalists, accepting the idea that state actors 
are rational in their choices and actions in a given situation, thus allowing international 
behavior to be studied as a science, with hard facts governing clear outcomes.  
Conversely, critical theorists balk at this idea, proffering that theory based on the idea 
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that human nature inexorably leads to the type of modern system of state-based 
behavior witnessed in the 20th century in fact works to recreate this very system, 
thereby taking an active role in shaping something that is not actually inevitable 
(Griffiths 2007: 54).  Critical theorists, such as Robert Cox, argued that it is necessary 
to ask how current structures came into being, to look at how and why they are 
changing, and moreover to understand alternative structures of power and politics.  
This type of analysis draws to some degree on the work of Karl Marx, who believed 
that social theory itself can perpetuate certain structural arrangements, which benefit 
some to the detriment of others (Griffiths 2007: 55).  Constructivism emerged from 
this debate, offering a new theoretical structure for analyzing contemporary 
international relations – building upon the critical theorists’ shift away from realism 
while taking the argument a step further, rejecting structuralism in favor of so-called 
post-structuralism, allowing room for the effects of individuals themselves and granting 
weight to the actions taken by each actor.    
In 1989, Nicholas Onuf published World of Our Making, marking the introduction of 
constructivism as a new theoretical structure within IR.  In 1992, Alexander Wendt 
popularized the theory in his article “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” and in the 
years following, these two theorists, along with others such as Friedrich Kratochwil and 
John Gerard Ruggie, brought constructivism into its current place as a key theory of 
analysis within the field of international relations (Zehfuss 2002: 11).  Constructivism 
as an IR theory does not necessarily argue against the underlying state-centric nature 
outlined in realism, instead disputing the perceived inevitability seen within realist 
analysis.  Realism is based in positivism, meaning the notion that an objective truth 
can always be found (Zehfuss 2002: 10). In contrast, constructivists are idealists, 
arguing that in lieu of objective truth there is simply a structure of meaning based on a 
continually reinforced system of understanding, which can also be referred to as norm 
creation (Griffiths 2007: 62). Norms and the surrounding system of understanding are 
upheld or changed through an ongoing two-way process between society and people, 
also called structures and actors or agents. Constructivists do not deny that realism 
heavily influenced political functioning, particularly in the U.S. in the latter half of the 
20th century, as the foundational ideas of realist theory became normative within 
political action.  As such, constructivist principles can now be used to analyze the 
realist-centric discourse of political actors. Each constructivist theorist maintains a 
different formula for approaching the cycle of constructed meaning, but for the 
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purposes of this thesis the theory will be referred to under an umbrella heading, with 
each individual’s work being referenced as necessary.   
The idea that agents and structures continually influence one another through an 
ongoing cycle of intersubjective reinforcement of meaning supports the notion that not 
only does objectivity not exist, but neither does neutrality. In this way, no speech act 
can be considered neutral, since all speech invariably either works to uphold or 
dismantle existing structures, which in turn affect the nature of speech. Thus, 
constructivism attempts to examine states’ and agents’ particular formations of a given 
reality, thereby accepting that there is no fixed linearity or inherited order to 
international relations (Okulska/ Cap: 2010). In general, constructivist ontology relies 
on three basic components: intersubjectivity, context, and power (Klotz/ Lynch 2007: 
7–10). Intersubjective understanding is comprised of the aforementioned norms, as 
well as rules, both of which make up social reality, guiding human behavior and action.  
Within such intersubjectivity exist material structures, which can include institutions, 
organizations, or physical objects such as uniforms or money. Constructivist analysis 
does not deny the meaning granted to such objects and structures, but instead 
acknowledges that such meaning is created and reinforced through the behavior of 
people within societies. As stated by the social scientists Audie Klotz and Cecelia 
Lynch, “constructivists characterize this interactive relationship between what people 
do and how societies shape their actions as the ‘mutual constitution’ of structures and 
agents” (Klotz/ Lynch 2007: 7). For this reason, context is also key to understanding a 
given circumstance or relationship, as meaning varies drastically across points in time, 
region, or culture.  Finally, power is understood by constructivists as operating within 
the ongoing relationship between actors and structures, rather than as the realist 
conception of zero-sum possession of capabilities (Klotz/ Lynch 2007: 11). In this way, 
the constructivist understanding of norm-based power draws heavily on the 
philosopher Michel Foucault’s usage of the term, noting that a relationship itself cannot 
connote a balance of power, but rather the ongoing iterations of that relationship, 
which are made up of a continuous cycle of actions and reactions between parties 
(Taylor 2011: 6).   
In this thesis a discourse analysis will be conducted, employing a conglomeration of 
concepts taken from the broad egis of constructivist theory, and following a 
methodological structure outlined most specifically by Henrik Larsen in his 1997 work 
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Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe. In this book, Larsen 
highlights the power of individual language understood within a post-structuralist 
reading. According to structuralist analysis there is no way to access meaning behind 
specific language, as the assignment of meaning to given words is viewed as arbitrary, 
thus creating a disconnect between language and its potential value.  Conversely, 
post-structuralists, including Foucault, believe that words themselves hold vast social 
meaning and therefore shifts in word usage greatly affect an overall discourse.  
Therefore, a word in a vacuum would hold no meaning, but through usage, social 
significance is built up through responses, reactions, and reiteration of language.  
Therefore a study of discourse must include not only the words themselves but, as 
described above, an examination of the surrounding intersubjectivity, context, and 
structures of power. Larsen utilizes Foucault’s term “discursive formations” in order to 
describe the summation of these concepts, as when an overarching theme or 
trajectory can be traced across areas of discourse (Larsen 1997: 12). In this way, this 
thesis will argue that the American understanding of U.S.-Turkey relations fashioned a 
discursive formation over the decades, as certain expectations of compliant partnership 
were repeatedly reflected through use of language and action across both actors and 
structures. 
Larsen argues that there is a key difference between changes in discourse and changes 
of discourse, with the latter occurring only after fundamental shifts in framework have 
transpired. In order to best approach analyzing such potential changes, he outlines a 
hierarchical structure through the use of what he calls a discursive tree: “governing 
statements” form the foundational core of a discourse and “concrete statements,” 
which can include both language and action, form branches (Larsen 1997: 17–18). 
Thus, Larsen suggests that while discourse can change direction, or be added to or 
detracted from, the Foucaultian idea of discursive formation is only affected if the 
governing statements are changed, consequently necessitating a new framework of 
understanding. In these terms, it is hypothesized that the American understanding of 
U.S.-Turkish relations maintained a singular discursive formation from the years after 
WWII all the way through the 2000s, as even in the face of volatile ups and downs in 
the alliance, a subject/object relationship was reiterated and American expectations of 
a return to tacit cooperation were reiterated. Moreover, this perception fit into the 
broader American understanding of foreign policy, which was grounded in realist, 
interest-based alliances.  Beginning with President Obama’s first visit to Turkey in early 
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2009, however, the governing statements began to shift, thereby suggesting an overall 
shift in discourse regarding the U.S.-Turkish partnership, situated within a larger shift 
in the American understanding of its role across the globe. This thesis will therefore 
use a detailed discourse analysis of this recent period, as compared to the years and 
decades prior, in an attempt to clarify whether a change has in fact occurred in the 
American understanding of its relations with Turkey dramatic enough to be classified 
as a full discursive shift.   
2.2 Selecting Material for Analysis  
Throughout the process of choosing material for analysis, as well as while engaging in 
analysis itself, the Foucaultian concept of a “history of the present” will be kept in mind 
(Campbell 1992: 5). In this way, this thesis will not try to analyze the history of U.S.-
Turkey relations or the history of America’s foreign policy, but simply a history. Just as 
constructivism recognizes that there can be no objective reality in international 
relations, so too does it encourage scholars to recognize their own subjectivity within 
their work. Such subjectivity will necessarily influence the selection of texts for analysis 
and the boundaries of analysis itself within this thesis; thus, it is with an awareness of 
this personal interpretation of events and discourse that this thesis will endeavor to 
address the American understanding of U.S.-Turkey relations and broader shifts in 
American foreign policy discourse. 
When choosing which speeches or press briefings to consult in the era of the 1980s 
through mid-1990s, the strikingly limited search results concerning Turkey reiterated 
the very recent nature of its role as a perceived prominent American partner. This fact 
alone offers preliminary support for the hypothesis that it was not until quite recently 
that the American understanding of relations began changing, instigating a 
corresponding rise in the discussion of U.S.-Turkish relations. Under these 
circumstances, as a way of maintaining consistency and building a basis for general 
discourse, the initial national address, the inaugural speech, will be examined from 
each of the three afore-mentioned presidents, as well as from Bush and Obama, 
focusing analysis on discussion of foreign policy and relations within the region, as well 
as how the discourse of American identity ties into foreign policy ideals. While there is 
arguably a great difference between the internal and external identities of states, in 
the case of examining American foreign policy it is pertinent to engage in a study of 
both, as it has been shown that American domestic policy and self-perception in fact 
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deeply affect foreign policy choices. Furthermore, because the individual president 
dictates the political discourse of the nation so greatly, this thesis will focus on these 
presidential speeches as the bedrock for understanding broader actions and decisions.   
To broaden the scope, however, numerous other speeches and texts will also be drawn 
upon, including transcripts from official visits and press briefings from meetings and 
events, all of which were found on official government and/or academic archival 
websites.Taken together, these documents and presidential speeches will form a 
chronological basis for the textual component of an in-depth analysis of American 
discourse concerning relations with Turkey, while also elucidating the broader 
American foreign policy discourse. They will be used to directly address the research 
questions laid out in the previous section of this thesis by offering a concrete means of 
locating American discourse within a broader framework, which will include an 
examination of institutional structures. Excerpts of the texts analyzed will be included 
within the body of the thesis in order to offer specific language-based analysis, while 
links to the full texts will be included in the Works Cited section.   
3. Analyzing the American Understanding of U.S.-
Turkey Relations 
3.1 Historical Background: Turkish Needs and U.S. Interests  
While Turkey has long been outwardly considered a European partner by the United 
States, its accepted role as an ally has been vastly different from the established role 
of nations within Western Europe.  Turkey’s unique geographic position and particular 
history grant it specific opportunities and potential importance within the diverse 
regions of Central Asia and the Middle East, as well as within Europe. Nevertheless, 
since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey largely remained an inward-
looking country, with only minimal ties to its neighbors and its main alliances based in 
Europe and the U.S. (Albright/ Hadley/ Cook 2012: 7). Turkey has been considered a 
strong American ally since the formation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, which 
emphasized Turkey’s strategic role in stemming the westward expansion of 
Communism (Campany 1986: 2). When Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in 1952, its Cold War position within the Western camp was 
concretized and its relationship with the United States reinforced.  In the 1950s and 
1960s, geostrategic relations remained close as American aid under the 1958 Joint 
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United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT) program helped to rapidly 
increase the size of the Turkish military and allowed for economic growth despite 
widely inefficient state enterprises (Campany 1986: 22).   
Less than two decades after Turkish troops fought alongside Americans in Korea, 
however, the United States made clear that such a favor would not be returned if the 
occasion arose. After Cyprus gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960, 
tensions over Greek versus Turkish control were increasingly resulting in violence on 
the small island, and the Turkish government under Prime Minister Inönü repeatedly 
threatened to intervene militarily in order to protect the Turkish Cypriot population 
(Couloumbis 1983: 61). In 1964, a divisive letter written by President Johnson was 
dispatched, stating plainly that if Turkish action on the island of Cyprus spurred a 
Soviet invasion, the U.S. would not come to Turkey’s aid.  This letter brought anti-
American sentiment on a wide scale, prompting the re-evaluation of Turkish foreign 
policy, with bilateral visits between Turkey and the USSR occurring in 1965, followed 
by the Turkish joining of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) with Iran 
and Pakistan in the same year (Capmany 1986: 33).  Such actions were viewed as 
transgressions from the accepted U.S.-Turkey relationship in the eyes of American 
leaders, underscoring an assumption of a liaison on unequal terms, in which Turkey 
was supposed to fall in line with American interests in exchange for aid, regardless of 
whether they actually reflected the needs, wants, or overall interests of the Turkish 
people.   
When the Turkish military invaded Cyprus in 1974, a bill was already being discussed 
in the U.S. House of Representatives to cancel all aid to Turkey on the grounds of 
Turkey’s refusal to uphold an American-imposed ban on poppy cultivation, which had 
been proposed in response to a growing heroin epidemic in the United States 
(Campany 1986: 34). Although the bill did not initially pass in Congress, a full 
embargo became effective in February 1975, cutting off all American aid to Turkey 
until “substantial progress” had been made towards peace in Cyprus (Campany 1986: 
56). This move shifted the focus of American geo-political pressure on Turkey, creating 
a new discourse in which the Cyprus issue was the key point of strife between the U.S. 
and Turkey.  The embargo is a prime example of how material structures gain their 
significance only through reinforced systems of meaning, which are subject to change 
as context changes.  While the same embargo was already being discussed in 
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reference to the poppy issue, as the conflict over Cyprus gained in importance, the 
exact same structure was then used to deny aid, while the entire system of meaning 
surrounding this structure vastly shifted in order to bring all focus to Cyprus.   
After the embargo passed, the Turkish Defense Minister countered by stating that 
unless aid was restored within thirty days, all U.S. military bases in Turkey would be 
closed. To this, Secretary of State Kissinger responded, “No one can threaten the U.S.” 
(Kissinger 1975, quoted in Campany 1986: 56), thus making explicit the perceived 
imbalance between the U.S. and Turkey, with Turkey as the necessarily submissive 
partner expected to pander to American demands while never making mandates of its 
own.  The American embargo remained in effect for the following three years, during 
which time technological advancement within the Turkish military stagnated and 
mistrust of the U.S. grew. This embargo is an example of a structural choice leading to 
a shift in importance and meaning of certain elements of the relationship, as previously 
the U.S. had not been explicitly involved in the dispute over Cyprus. Because the 
embargo was such a drastic structure of power, it thereby granted much greater 
weight to the American understanding of the Cyprus dispute, creating space for a shift 
in discursive concrete statements and prompting further American involvement over 
the island of Cyprus.  Additionally, this embargo set precedent for an imbalanced and 
tension-ridden relationship between the U.S. and Turkey, with much of the Turkish 
population growing hostile towards a partner who seemed to nonchalantly flaunt its 
power to the detriment of its ally, particularly in relation to an issue that many Turks 
felt was outside of American jurisdiction. After a long discussion in both houses of 
Congress the embargo was ended in 1978, after which President Carter made brief 
remarks to the public.  He stated: 
“In recent weeks there have been signs of improvement in the web of problems 
affecting relations among Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. These developments helped 
produce the congressional actions which will now enable us to put the embargo era 
behind us. … Today’s decision by the House is a crucial step toward strengthening the 
vital southern flank of NATO.  It will soon make possible the reopening of our military 
instillations in Turkey.  And it brings all the parties concerned closer to the goals of 
peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean.” (Carter 1978) 
This statement makes clear the underlying motivations of the lifting of the embargo, 
namely American strategic security. The explicit connection of the goals of “peace and 
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security” highlights the understanding of American interests at the time, furthering the 
role laid out for Turkey as a buffer against Soviet expansion. Carter casually states 
that the embargo era can now be left behind, thereby speaking from a distinctly 
American perspective while making the assumption that his words hold true for all 
parties involved. This American understanding of the U.S.-Turkish relationship is 
wholly uni-dimensional, situating Turkey simply as the “vital southern flank of NATO” 
(Carter 1978) while overlooking any interests of Turkey itself. 
In early 1980, with the Cyprus issue, in fact, still broiling between Greece and Turkey, 
and both right and left-wing terrorism on the rise, the United States passed a new 
Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA), based on what an official 
American report referred to as “Turkish needs and U.S. interests” (Couloumbis 1983: 
153). This language once again reflects the ongoing perception that the American-
Turkish partnership was one in which the U.S. held greater sway, noting that while 
both countries benefitted from their mutual relationship, the perceived motivations 
behind their involvement were not of the same ilk.  The perception of Turkish need 
referred largely to the two years of economic crisis directly preceding this deal, which 
were principally a result of a shortage of foreign exchange (Diner 2011: 308). The 
economic as well as political situation in Turkey thus put it at a strong disadvantage in 
terms of bargaining power, furthering the image of reliant partner understood by the 
U.S. Moreover, this particular phrasing puts the impetus of power on the American 
side, as an “interest” is never as pressing as a “need,” therefore insinuating that the 
U.S. could choose its level of involvement whereas Turkey was not in a position for 
independent decision making. The shift from arms embargo to security-based 
cooperation was largely a result of regional events which occurred in 1979, namely the 
Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. American officials feared 
that the domino effect was now more likely to occur than ever, with radicalism and 
communism set to spread across the Middle East. The U.S. therefore looked to Turkey 
now not as a buffer against communist expansion into Western Europe, as it had in the 
early years of the Cold War, but instead as an asset towards helping secure American 
interests in what was then referred to as Southwest Asia, specifically the vast oil 
reserves in countries such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Han 2010: 90). This change in 
circumstances allowed for the continued understanding of Turkey as a regionally 
strategic partner, while shifting the perception of Turkey from a European to a more 
diverse partner, with the alliance still firmly based in American security interests. 
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A few short months after DECA was passed, in an ongoing climate of intense political 
instability and acute economic hardship, a military coup d’état took place, ousting 
Prime Minister Demirel in favor of a military regime upholding martial law.  In contrast 
to the Turkish putsches of 1960 and 1971, the 1980 coup resulted in multiple years of 
undemocratic rule, during which time the junta leaders reaffirmed some of Turkey’s 
Western alliances, particularly with NATO and the U.S. (Couloumbis 1983: 161).  
Turkish relations with much of Europe deteriorated after the coup, but the American 
policy was to overlook what were considered cultural matters in favor of a more 
hardheaded alliance focused solely on strategic interests, as outlined by Commander-
in-Chief of Allied Forces Southeastern Europe Admiral Crowe, who stated, “No Western 
or Soviet planner can address the Middle East challenge without considering Turkey’s 
orientation, terrain, airspace, forces and bases” (Crowe 1980 quoted in Karasapn 
1989). This statement makes clear the geo-strategic importance of Turkey, while also 
once more emphasizing the complete lack of interest in Turkish domestic affairs.  The 
willingness of U.S. leaders to work closely with Turkish military officials while keeping a 
blind eye to vast human rights abuses underscores the pragmatic nature of relations 
and the, while also emphasizing the enhanced importance of Turkey as a strategic 
regional ally.   
The military leaders retained Turgut Özal as the Minister of Economics, who continued 
an overhaul of the floundering economy, which he had begun under Demirel, largely by 
opening it up to international market forces to a degree large enough to qualify the 
nation for the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) support and stabilization programs.   
This move prompted a 65% increase in Turkish exports (Couloumbis 1983: 161), and 
the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Investment, drastically shifting the nature 
of an economy that previously attained its largest source of foreign exchange through 
the remittances of workers in western European nations (Campany 1986: 50).  These 
economic changes were top-down and strongly influenced by a global shift toward 
neoliberal market policies. The idea of neoliberalism in this context can be described by 
what became known as the “Washington consensus” concerning economic affairs 
across the developing world, meaning a liberalization of interest rates, liberalization of 
trade and inflow of foreign direct investment, vast privatization, general market 
deregulation, and the officialization of private property laws (Diner 2011: 306). While 
ideas of neoliberalism had been around for decades within the U.S., it was not until the 
mid-1980s that they became prominent on the world stage within such organizations 
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as the IMF and the World Bank (Drolet 2011: 95). Such changes were generally 
promoted as tools to increase competition while decreasing state-centered clientelism 
and corruption. Yet, such reforms under Turgut Özal were conducted with few checks 
and balances, thereby creating a great consolidation of power and laying the 
groundwork for increased, rather than decreased corruption. Moreover, the creation of 
new bureaucratic departments, such as the Ministry of Foreign Investment mentioned 
above, or the so-called Privatization Administration, created intra-bureaucratic conflicts 
and further slowed down the state economic apparatus (Öniş 2004: 3). Because these 
negative consequences took years to harden into pervasive issues, it has been argued 
that economic reform was relatively successful in the 1980s while sliding into disaster 
by the end of the 1990s (Öniş 2004: 3).   
At the same time, following the break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War, there was some question regarding the direction Turkey would take in both its 
domestic and foreign policy. Yet, the underlying assumption of an ongoing alliance with 
the United States remained evident within American foreign policy discourse 
throughout the 1990s, even as Turkey began forging stronger relationships with the 
new nations of Central Asia and its neighbors across the Middle East (Albright, Hadley, 
and Cook 2012: 39). As such, many analysts have argued that the U.S. took Turkey 
for granted as an ally throughout the duration of the Cold War and the initial years 
following, as even in the face of such striking issues as the embargo and the ongoing 
Cyprus dispute, there is evidence of an underlying assumption that Turkey would 
continue to pander to American wishes if the correct pressure were applied and aid 
was kept flowing (Grigoriadis 2007: 55). This anticipated partnership was one in which 
Turkey, as the subject of American interests, was never viewed as an equal. Thus, in 
contrast to American national interests, Turkish interests, much less the interests of its 
people, were never paid specific heed. This thesis will argue that it is precisely this 
assumption that has begun to change in recent years, as Turkey has gained power on 
the geo-political scale and American strategies in its foreign policy have slowly begun 
to shift away from a strict rubric of neoliberal and realist-based formulas towards more 
concrete recognition of the interests and wishes of allied nations beyond those of 
Western Europe.   
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3.2 Reagan: Freedom and Neoliberalism  
President Ronald Reagan delivered his inaugural address on January 20th, 1981.  He 
begins his speech by addressing the issue of rapid inflation in the American economy, 
stating that “in this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; 
government is the problem” (Reagan 1981). Without putting forth any specific policy, 
Reagan spends the initial paragraphs emphasizing the need to “put America back to 
work” by “freeing America from the terror of runaway living costs” (1981). He goes on 
to state that the reason the U.S. has been able to be a prosperous and powerful 
country in the past is because “freedom and dignity of the individual have been more 
available and assured here than in any other place on Earth. The price for this freedom 
at times has been high, but we have never been unwilling to pay it” (Reagan 1981).  
At this point, Reagan has created a specific connotation for the word freedom by using 
it three times, first as an action verb in reference to what he will do as president in 
order to create jobs and lower taxes, and second in noun form as a concept enshrined 
in individual Americans. By using the two forms of this term in direct succession, 
Reagan creates a dichotomy between the portrayed evil of high cost of living 
(ostensibly created by too much government) and the personal freedom historically 
enjoyed by individual Americans. This dichotomy acts as a backbone for the yet 
unspoken agenda that was to be unfurled in the coming years of the Reagan era, 
which would come to be known as “Reaganomics.” Reagan’s economic theory was 
largely in line with neoliberal ideas of deregulation and privatization, while also pushing 
supply-side economics, meaning lowered taxes under the premise that people will work 
harder and put more money into the economy on their own if granted lower income 
taxes (Drolet 2011: 96). By making a direct tie between high living costs and terror 
while reiterating the importance of individual freedom as an American value, Reagan 
quickly generated a strong discourse of neoliberal economic policy embedded within a 
nationalist and moralistic framework. 
Reagan then goes on to say, “and as we renew ourselves here in our own land, we will 
be seen has having greater strength throughout the world.  We will again be the 
exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom” 
(1981). With this statement, Reagan is both promoting the vague system of neoliberal 
economic and moral values he has outlined above, while also creating a self/other 
relationship between the U.S. and “those who do not now have freedom.”  In doing so, 
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he is also directly encouraging his vision of the American understanding of freedom, 
thereby endorsing the concomitant system he proposes will best promote such 
freedom. He follows these statements by saying: 
“To those neighbors and allies who share our freedom, we will strengthen our historic 
ties and assure them of our support and firm commitment.  We will match loyalty with 
loyalty. We will strive for mutually beneficial relations.  We will not use our friendship 
to impose on their sovereignty, for our own sovereignty is not for sale.  As for the 
enemies of freedom, those who are potential adversaries, they will be reminded that 
peace is the highest aspiration of the American people… We will maintain sufficient 
strength to prevail if need be, knowing that if we do so we have the best chance of 
never having to use that strength.” (Reagan 1981) 
This last statement underscores the realist conception of the “security dilemma.” In 
this predicament, it is thought that states can continually increase their own security 
by increasing power, which is understood in this case largely as a build-up of military 
and weaponry, as well as strategic alliances. According to this theory, which strongly 
guided Cold War policy, the heightened power of one state inherently decreases the 
security of opposing states (Jackson/ Towle 2006: 15). However, in the sentences prior 
to Reagan’s stated belief in the military solution to the security dilemma, he notes that 
he will support American allies while not imposing on their sovereignty.  When 
examined closely, however, it must be noted that he specifically states neighbors and 
allies “who share our freedom” (Reagan 1981). This specification shifts the nature of 
his statement, indicating that he in fact only refers to those countries who support his 
previously outlined notion of freedom, meaning a system of neoliberal economic 
policies.  As such, while he explicitly states a desire to allow countries their own 
sovereignty, he is also promoting broadly overhauled economic systems in order to 
align more nations with the interests of the United States, while simultaneously 
promoting an expanded military as means of intimidating those who do not fall in line 
with his promoted policy. In this way, Reagan’s usage of the term “ally” is strongly tied 
to the specific understanding of freedom he is structuring, indicating that only those 
countries that embrace neoliberal economic policies are in fact American allies.  
Understanding the overarching discourse Reagan was building through the use of such 
language helps to situate the actions and choices made by American policy actors 
during this time, thereby outlining the broader perspective guiding foreign policy.  
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While Reagan used the verb “free” three times and the noun “freedom” eight times in 
his inaugural address from 1981, he upped the usage of the noun to thirteen during his 
1985 speech, while once again employing the verb three times.  In this address the 
president emphasizes the success his economic overhaul has brought the country, 
reiterating that “tax rates have been reduced, inflation cut dramatically, and more 
people are employed than ever before in our history” (Reagan 1985). Reagan implies 
that this has been achieved because “our economy was finally freed from 
government’s grip.” Thus, he is once again praising neoliberal economic ideas as the 
road to freedom, further emphasizing this connection between a deregulated economy 
and a free individual. In this address Reagan focuses largely on domestic issues, with 
his only discussion of foreign policy in direct relation to the Soviet Union, who is 
portrayed as an enemy of freedom. He states: 
“America must remain freedom’s staunchest friend, for freedom is our best ally and it 
is the world’s only hope to conquer poverty and preserve peace.  Every blow we inflict 
against poverty will be a blow against its dark allies of oppression and war.  Every 
victory for human freedom will be a victory for world peace.” (Reagan 1985) 
By once again drawing a direct line between economic prosperity based on neoliberal 
principals and the concept of human freedom, Reagan has created a platform for 
promoting neoliberal principles on the world stage, structured within a highly domestic 
idea of freedom. In this way, the sole definition of freedom given is in reference to 
economic issues, while the usage of the term can vary, creating rhetorical ambiguity 
while maintaining an underlying discourse of neoliberal economics as the basis for all 
positive outcomes. Moreover, Reagan draws explicit parallel between American 
prosperity and world peace, placing American economic success as the highest 
benchmark in terms of examining global interactions. In this excerpt, Reagan uses 
“ally” not in reference to other countries, but rather to his concept of freedom itself.  
In doing so he solidifies the discursive tie between neoliberal economic structures, 
conceptions of freedom, and the U.S. itself, while also promoting each of these as 
universally positive. 
The framework of each of these speeches, tying changes in domestic policy to specific 
ideas of what constitutes appropriate functioning across the global economy, was 
reflected in Reagan’s foreign policy in general. Within his first year in office Reagan had 
already begun tying market capitalism to aid eligibility across the developing world 
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(Drolet 2011: 141). These policies affected not only bilateral agreements but also 
swiftly influenced the functioning of the IMF and the World Bank, prompting the 
previously mentioned “Washington Consensus” (Drolet 2011: 141). A vast overhaul of 
developing economies swept the globe, thereby shifting the structures of 
intersubjective power previously held by so-called Third World countries as counter-
weights within the U.S.-Soviet power struggle throughout the Cold War. As developing 
nations dismantled state systems and opened their economies along neoliberal lines, 
they joined the global economy on terms outlined by the West, thus aligning 
themselves with the capitalist camp while relinquishing autonomy in favor of potential 
economic gain. Near the end of Reagan’s presidency, as the Iron Curtain was 
beginning to crumble and Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika were quickly 
shifting the very nature of the Soviet Union, Reagan said in a foreign policy address 
that, “These democratic and free-market revolutions are really the same revolution” 
(1988). This quote succinctly summarizes the position he had been putting forth since 
coming into office – namely that a liberalized economy is the sole important factor in 
his understanding of freedom and democracy.  
As Turkey began its vast economic overhaul in the years between Reagan’s two 
inaugural addresses, it falls easily into the category of “ally” the president outlined in 
his initial speech. In his first years as prime minister, Özal lifted all import quotas, 
completely removed price controls on both imported and domestically produced goods, 
and allowed banks to set interest rates freely.  Within four years of implementing such 
changes the volume of trade neared 30% of gross national product (GNP), which was 
double what it had been previously (Abramowitz 2003: 35). Although much of this 
change was taking place without strict oversight or necessary infrastructure to allow 
solid economic policy, it was the act of undertaking such liberalization, rather than the 
domestic consequences, that underscored Turkey’s role as an American ally according 
to Reagan’s understanding of the term. Moreover, the economic liberalization in Turkey 
was coupled with a shift in the composition of the middle and upper classes, as more 
religious and conservative businessmen from central Anatolia gained ground in areas 
traditionally dominated by secular elite (Zanotti 2012: 7). These shifts were little 
remarked upon by American leaders, however, as the discourse remained 
predominantly concerned with Cold War ideas of security and the expansion of 
neoliberal policies.  This lack of interest paid to domestic issues highlights the ongoing 
nature of the Turkish-American relationship as one in which Turkish success in 
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geostrategic terms was promoted by the U.S. not out of inherent interest, but rather 
out of self-interested drive for security across the region.  The limited, realist definition 
of security being employed, however, narrowed the field of vision and understanding, 
thereby foregoing possible discussion of changes that would affect relations in the 
future. 
The expansion of neoliberal relations was reiterated by a number of novel initiatives 
centered on trade and joint military investment, including the production of F-16 
fighter planes on Turkish soil, funded by American dollars.  In 1985 the two nations 
signed the Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of 
Investments and also jointly founded the Turkish-U.S. Business Council (Akyüz 2000).  
Both of these signified a certain broadening of the longstanding American 
understanding of Turkey’s position solely as buffer against Soviet expansion, 
heightening the importance of trade instead of focusing entirely on military-based 
security. In remarks following the signing of these initiatives Reagan stated, “Prime 
Minister Özal’s official visit, the first in more than a decade by a Turkish leader, has 
been an important part of a long-overdue revitalization in U.S.-Turkish relations” 
(1985). With such an opening statement, Reagan made concrete his position on the 
enhanced importance of the alliance while also granting weight to its changing nature.  
Later in the speech he speaks directly to Özal, saying, “You’re a good friend and 
important ally, and I thank you for all that you’re doing to strengthen our cooperation.  
Together, we’re serving the cause of peace and freedom” (Reagan 1985). Here Reagan 
is directly tying his neoliberal idea of economic-based freedom to his understanding of 
America’s relationship with Turkey, while also specifying the impetus for such a 
relationship to Özal himself, thereby heightening the importance of Özal as a specific 
actor in the reiteration of this relationship. Later in the same year, Turkish officials 
demanded that changes be made to the 1980 DECA, of which the U.S accepted only a 
few (Uzgel 2002). This move underscored the remaining inequality of the partnership, 
highlighting the fact that although the focus of relations and its public nature might be 
changing, the underlying governing statement remained the same – American strategic 
interests guide the relationship and Turkish interests do not hold the same weight. 
Prime Minister Özal, however, was quite vociferous about his demand for “trade, not 
aid” (Akyüz 2000), which he made explicit during his two trips to Washington in 1985 
and 1987.  No other Turkish prime minister had ever been to Washington twice on 
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official visits, further indicating a shift in the level of perceived importance concerning 
relations between the two countries. Each visit allowed for more interpersonal 
interactions, creating space for dialogue and setting the stage for potentially significant 
decisions.  Yet, even as trade relations were increasing, numerous other factors were 
also strongly affecting the U.S.-Turkish relationship. For instance, stagnated 
negotiations concerning Cyprus prompted the drafting of another American bill in 1987 
prohibiting the use of U.S. aid in military operations on the island, which in turn 
spurred Turkish officials to once again threaten the temporary closure of American 
bases (Uzgel 2002). Neither action was undertaken, stressing the pragmatic nature of 
the relationship, but also its continued imbalance.  While both nations were pushing for 
their own interests, on each side of the deal lay American military technology and 
force, with Turkish leverage coming only from its geostrategic position. This type of 
deal making is borne of realist strategy, with a focus not on the long-term relationship 
but rather on the immediate interests and potential gains pushed for by the dominant 
partner. Yet, the increase in both military and economic relations helped bring the 
U.S.-Turkish partnership back into a positive realm after the dismal years of the 1970s 
and early 1980s.   
At the very end of his term, President Reagan welcomed his Turkish counterpart, 
President Evren, to the White House on an official visit.  Evren had come into his post 
through the 1980 coup, and his leadership had been strongly supported by Washington 
even before his official election to presidency in 1982. Evren was one of the key 
drafters of the 1980 constitution, which highly restricted many civil liberties in the 
name of national security (Karasapan 1989). At his visit in 1988, Reagan awarded 
Evren with the Legion of Merit, Chief Commander for Turkey’s service in the Korean 
conflict forty years prior.  During the ceremony Reagan stated, “In Korea, Turks and 
Americans shed blood together on the battlefield in defense of freedom.  Today the 
solidarity of our mutual commitment to collective security keeps us safe…” (1988).  
This statement, as well as the award ceremony overall, act as tools of power in the 
constructivist sense, as they highlight the understanding of a mutual relationship 
based on the American conception of freedom and security. By referencing a past 
event in which Turkey aided an American military initiative while tying such an event 
to particular ideological concepts, Reagan’s words and actions worked to normativize 
these concepts and reinforce a particular framework of meaning. Reagan goes on to 
say, “Americans have admired the way that Turkey pulled itself back to democracy 
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when challenged by the violent forces of terrorism and anarchy a decade ago” (1988).  
By using such language to reference the 1980 coup d’état, Reagan further highlights 
only a partial narrative of past events, thereby maintaining the understanding of an 
alliance based on pragmatic recognition of perceived positive attributes and an ongoing 
tendency to ignore what were seen as domestic cultural issues, including sweeping loss 
of civil liberties or human rights abuses. This understanding reinforced the power 
dynamic of a weaker Turkish ally by undercutting the people of the nation while 
simultaneously allowing for a positive public image by stressing only the ties of interest 
to U.S. officials.  Such a dynamic fit into Reagan’s broader foreign policy schematic, 
which was based strictly on realist notions of interest-based action built around a 
framework of neoliberal economic policy. 
3.3 G.H.W. Bush: Freedom and the Gulf War   
In his inaugural address in January 1989, President George H.W. Bush followed in 
Reagan’s footsteps, using the word “free” nine times and “freedom” six.  The similar 
usage of this term connotes a normatization of a particular meaning, as the repeated 
usage in the specific neoliberal, conservative American framework granted the term 
social meaning in this context. Bush begins his speech by focusing on the changing 
tide in governments across the world. Without referencing any specific nation, he says 
simply, “Great nations of the world are moving toward democracy through the door to 
freedom.  Men and women of the world move toward free markets through the door to 
prosperity” (Bush 1989). With such a statement, Bush is reiterating Reagan’s 
understanding of the inevitability of connections between free markets, economic 
success, and democracy.  Bush goes on to talk mainly in platitudes concerning human 
value and national goodness, keeping his sentences void of specific policy suggestions.  
In regard to foreign policy he states, “To the world, too, we offer new engagement and 
a renewed vow: We will stay strong to protect the peace” (Bush 1989). Not offering 
any further information on this subject, such an assertion can be understood in a 
variety of ways, but its underlying message presaged the actions undertaken both 
during his presidency as well as under President Clinton, as American-led humanitarian 
intervention took center stage in the decade following the end of the Cold War.   
One major issue of humanitarian concern, which boiled over into a matter international 
involvement during this period, was that of the Kurdish minority in the nations of Iraq, 
Iran, Syria, and Turkey.  Since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Kurds 
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lacked official recognition as an ethnic minority group, following the nationalist rhetoric 
of a singular Turkish people and the continued use of the Ottoman guideline of only 
recognizing religious minorities (Gunter 1990: 53). This policy was harshly enforced 
through bans on use or teaching of the Kurdish language, and widespread suppression 
of Kurdish tradition or exhibits of group identity. The deputy chairman of the 
Motherland Party under Prime Minister Özal was quoted as saying, “some Turks speak 
dialects, but there is no Kurdish minority in Turkey” (Taşcioğlu 1989, quoted in Gunter 
1990: 51). Such denial of the group’s existence became increasingly difficult by the 
late 1970s and 1980s, however, as the rise of radical politics coincided with the rise of 
Kurdish separatism and the foundation of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), headed 
by Abdullah Öcalan. In 1984, the Turkish military began what would become a decades 
long assault against the guerilla PKK army in southeastern Anatolia, resulting in tens of 
thousands of civilian deaths (Abramowitz 2003: 85).   
By 1990, the ongoing conflict between the Turkish army and the PKK had intensified 
and was thrust into the national spotlight due to the American-led invasion of Iraq and 
the ensuing Gulf War. In January 1990, Özal made his third official visit to Washington, 
meeting with President Bush and underscoring Turkey’s interest in a continued close 
alliance with the U.S. (Uzgel 2002). After Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, 
Turkey quickly backed the U.S. in enforcing sanctions and closing its oil pipeline with 
its neighbor, although at the time Iraq was Turkey’s second largest trading partner 
after Germany, with the pipeline providing abundant revenue.  By the following year, 
top-down support for the Gulf War was fervent, headed by Özal, who had shifted into 
the role of president in 1989 (Bresheeth/ Yuval-Davis 1991: 80–83). The Grand 
National Assembly backed Özal, spurring the deployment of 200,000 Turkish troops to 
the Iraqi border and allowing the immediate use of Incirlik Airbase as the launching 
point for a second allied front into Iraq under the UN-backed Operation Desert Storm 
(Bresheeth/ Yuval-Davis 1991: 80). This marked a distinct break in Turkey from 
decades of isolationist policy, particularly in the realm of Middle East affairs, setting the 
stage for a new path in Turkish foreign policy.   
Moreover, popular opposition to Turkish involvement in the war was widespread, with 
opinion polls showing up to 88% of Turks against it (Bresheeth/ Yuval-Davis 1991: 
80). The disparity between zealous elite support and pervasive opposition among the 
general populous indicates strategic reasoning extending beyond the stated 
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humanitarian interest in coming to the aid of fellow sovereign nations. By the end of 
the Cold War, Turkey was the third largest recipient of American aid, and while Özal 
was interested in changing the aid-based relationship, he did not want to lose the close 
connection to the world’s emerging singular hegemonic power (Han 2010: 89). In a 
press conference regarding the status of the Gulf War, President Bush opened by 
referencing his close communication with high-level officials from Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia, as well as with President Özal in Turkey.  Bush states that Özal was “somewhat 
optimistic about the effectiveness of these international sanctions,” placing high value 
on the Turkish opinion while also giving a quote that lacks concrete valence (1990). By 
referencing Turkey’s involvement in the very beginning of his speech and making note 
of Özal’s opinion on the state of affairs, Bush is normativizing Turkish participation in 
the Gulf War while also placing a third party between himself and the onus of 
responsibility. At the same time, Özal was openly arguing that staunch support of the 
American invasion was the only way to ensure an advantageous position in the future 
of regional dealings (Bresheeth/ Yuval-Davis 1991: 81). Such a statement reiterates 
the continued subject/object dynamic while also denoting a slight shift in concrete 
statements coming from Turkey, as Özal was pandering to American demands with 
Turkish strategic interests in mind.  
Yet, Turkish security interests were also based around the longstanding fear that if 
Iraq were to fall apart the Kurdish issue would become untenable across the region.  
Within a few months of the inception of war, thousands of Kurdish refugees began 
fleeing from northern Iraq into southeastern Turkey. Özal responded pragmatically, 
supporting the allied Operation Provide Comfort by setting up a safe haven for 
refugees while deploying additional forces to protect Kurds in northern Iraq (Uzgel 
2002).  In June of 1991, President Bush visited Ankara, marking the first American 
presidential visit since Eisenhower (Bush 1991). Bush spoke of an enhanced 
partnership between the two nations (Prager 2003: 5), quelling fears that Turkey 
would become irrelevant in American strategy as the Cold War was coming to an end 
and boosting Özal’s choice regarding Turkish involvement in the Gulf War and its 
protection of Kurdish refugees. This visit and the discourse outlined in Bush’s speech 
also highlighting a change in Turkish-American relations, linked to the regional 
changes resulting in the fall of the USSR.  Yet, the inherent assumptions upholding the 
relationship remained the same, thus indicating a shift only in concrete statements, 
but not the overall governing statement influencing the alliance.  In a press conference 
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after returning to the U.S., a reporter asked Bush whether Turkey was stronger ally 
than before the start of the Gulf War. In response, Bush hedges a bit, stating, “If you 
would rephrase it from ‘stronger ally’ to say ‘more appreciated here,’ I would certainly 
say, true” (1991). With this answer, it could be argued that Özal’s efforts received the 
desired outcome, as Turkey is receiving open appreciation as an ally. Yet, the linguistic 
choice of appreciation over strength in alliance once again belittles Turkey’s side of the 
relationship, placing them in a position to await praise from the dominant partner 
rather than respect as an ally on equal footing. 
While Özal made broader concessions concerning the Kurdish minority than any 
previous Turkish leader had, he also made clear his support for further Turkish military 
intervention into Iraq if there was movement towards an independent Kurdish state 
(Bresheeth/ Yuval-Davis 1991: 87). In 1992, Prime Minister Demirel (who was once 
again elected to this office after being allowed back into politics many years after the 
1980 coup d’état) made his first visit to the U.S., meeting with President Bush and 
other senior officials. The two leaders publicly stated that the continuation of sanctions 
against Iraq and the communal fight against terrorism, such as that of the PKK, would 
be two key allied priorities (Uzgel 2002). This statement offered further support of an 
ongoing U.S.-Turkish alliance in the face of the crumbling Soviet Union, marking the 
shift from Cold War partnership based on realist ideas of deterrence and regional 
buffers to strategic alliance focusing on new regional instabilities and communal 
interests.  Thus, it can be argued that what had previously been dubbed a marriage of 
convenience was increasingly becoming one of mutual choice, though undeniably still 
on highly unequal footing. This alliance reflected the ongoing predominant philosophies 
guiding American foreign policy at the time, namely realism and neoliberalism.  
Although the fall of the USSR shifted the nature of the global playing field, policies 
under Bush did not diverge significantly from those of his predecessor, instead 
remaining within a continued discursive framework of interest-based action and 
rhetoric. 
3.4 Clinton: Free Markets and Democracy Promotion  
When Bill Clinton took office in 1992, it seemed that he was interested in changing 
course to some degree, embracing the new era in global politics with ideas diverging 
from strict realism. With the Soviet Union dissolved, a plethora of unstable, newly 
independent nations were left in its wake. In his meeting with Prime Minister Demirel, 
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President Bush had stated his support for Turkey to act as a model to the newly 
founded Central Asian republics, marking the first explicit mention of Turkey as a 
model nation (Uzgel 2002). This statement promoted both the American support for 
the current iteration of Turkish nationhood (a secular emerging democracy with 
Western ties and an open market), as well as the continued belief in the importance of 
American ideals in structuring the future of the emerging nations across the region, as 
it was the American-approved aspects of Turkish society that Bush was promoting.  In 
his inaugural address, Clinton firmly speaks to this standpoint, stating, “Today, a 
generation raised in the shadows of the Cold War assumes new responsibilities in a 
world warmed by the sunshine of freedom but threatened still by ancient hatreds and 
new plagues” (1993). While using the word “freedom” early on, Clinton utter it only 
three times throughout his speech, saying the word “free” just once. Still, his usage 
reflects an understanding based acutely in neoliberal ideals, thereby upholding the 
particular normative framework utilized by both Reagan and Bush.  Clinton goes on to 
address the fall of the USSR, saying, “Today, as an older order passes, the new world 
is more free but less stable. Communism’s collapse has called forth old animosities and 
new dangers.  Clearly, America must continue to lead the world we did so much to 
make” (Clinton 1993). The latter half of this statement explicitly references the 
understanding that it is American-style democracy that is now emerging across the 
globe, and that it was American initiative that helped bring about this change.  Such an 
assertion implicitly upholds Cold War ideals by granting America a particular 
importance in this transition, while also stating it as self-evident that the U.S. should 
continue to “lead the world.” This type of discourse asserts power, which must then be 
reiterated through action and the reaction of others in order for it to be validated and 
upheld.  While the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey was shifting in terms of 
strategic reasoning during this time, the ongoing dynamic of the alliance allowed for 
precisely such a reiteration of the American understanding of power inherent in 
Clinton’s words.   
Clinton goes on to further outline his understanding of American interest in nations 
around the world, making clear that the particular American understandings of 
democracy and freedom are at the core of his policy. He states: 
“When our vital interests are challenged or the will and conscience of the international 
community is defied, we will act, with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with 
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force when necessary. … Our hopes, our hearts, our hands are with those on every 
continent who are building democracy and freedom.  Their cause is America’s cause.” 
(Clinton 1993) 
Here Clinton explicitly states that the causes of democracy and freedom are America’s 
causes, and that through either peaceful or aggressive intervention the U.S. will seek 
to implement some form of these concepts. Within Clinton’s first year in office, 
numerous discussions and treaties were undertaken with Turkey which follow this 
rhetoric, including tripartite talks in which the U.S., Russia, and Turkey discussed the 
upheaval in Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as an official visit by then Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher, during which he promoted Turkey as a stabilizing secular 
power within the region (Uzgel 2002). This proclamation falls directly in line with the 
sentiment outlined in Clinton’s speech, as American ideals are promoted while 
seemingly empowering other nations along the way. While it cannot be argued that the 
praise given to Turkey during this time harmed the U.S.-Turkish alliance, the selective 
nature of that praise highlights the continued inequality in the relationship, as the U.S. 
promoted the elements of the Turkish nation reflecting its own interests, while 
alternately ignoring or condemning the elements seen as unsavory.   
Although Turkey was still deeply shaken both economically and morally by the effects 
of the Gulf War, when Yugoslavia began its slow break-up in 1992 Turkey was quick to 
show its interest in becoming involved in the international effort to contain Serbian 
aggression and quell the conflicts erupting between ethnic groups. This stance 
underlined the changing nature of Turkish foreign policy, as instability in the Balkans 
did not directly threaten Turkey, instead posing only a “soft security” issue (Coşkun 
2011: 6). With its geostrategic identity in a state of heightened flux, however, Turkish 
officials wanted to show Europe that they cared about the stability of the neighborhood 
while also showing the U.S. that they were a consistent ally sharing similar values.  
Turkey also called on the broader Muslim world to come to Bosnia’s aid, harkening 
back to its historical Ottoman past to boost its ties to modern Bosnia (Coşkun 2011: 
14). This diverse involvement highlights Turkey’s burgeoning strategy of playing all of 
its cards and looking to the region to strengthen ties in each direction.  As the conflict 
in Bosnia heated up, Turkish officials were involved in the diplomatic efforts to subdue 
violence in its first years, and Turkish soldiers facilitated the NATO intervention in 
1995. U.S. officials recognized the important role Turkey played in the humanitarian 
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effort, thereby encouraging Turkish participation in potential regional conflicts in the 
future while also reinforcing the new role Turkey was coming to play as a strong ally to 
Western interventionist powers. 
While American aid was no longer flowing at the rate it had during the Cold War, the 
assistance-based relationship between the U.S. and Turkey was still strong.  In 1994, a 
foreign aid bill to Turkey was signed by President Clinton containing the specific 
condition that 10% of the aid be used to support human rights and to promote 
progress on the island of Cyprus. In response, recently elected Turkish Prime Minister 
Çiller accepted the aid package – minus the 10% set aside for human rights purposes.  
While this act was unquestionably assertive, the discourse put forth following the 
delivery of the aid package (as well as, of course, the granting of aid itself) reiterated 
the continuance of interest-based actions on both sides, as well as the unequal nature 
of the alliance.  At a press conference, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke 
simply stated that it would be “extremely unproductive” to allow such an issue to harm 
U.S.-Turkish relations (Uzgel 2002). This statement and the discourse it espouses 
belittles the integrity of the Turkish nation by implicitly stating that the rights of 
Turkish people are in fact inferior to the American investment in the relationship, 
thereby quietly dismissing the American push for an improvement of human rights in 
Turkey and exposing what proved to be empty rhetoric in Clinton’s 10% condition.  
Such an act directly contradicts Clinton’s stance as the humanitarian president, 
thereby underscoring the lack of a true discursive shift in the U.S.’s understanding of 
its relations to Turkey. This assertion occurred at the same time that economic 
functioning across Europe was becoming more and more integrated, and increasingly 
excluding Turkey, often on grounds of their poor human rights record. This exclusion 
prompted Turkey to seek greater connections to the U.S., both because American 
leaders had openly brushed aside the importance of human rights violations, as well as 
in the hope that strengthening the U.S. alliance would in turn lead to stronger ties to 
Europe (Han 2010: 90). 
During this period the Turkish-American partnership was also further expanding in the 
realm of trade, for instance through the 1993 foundation of the Joint Economic 
Commission (JEC), solidifying the U.S.’s role as a strong contributor of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (Han 2010: 89). Yet, the sudden death of Turgut Özal that same 
year made starkly apparent the importance of his individual leadership, highlighting 
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the huge role he had personally played in selling his economic and foreign policy to the 
Turkish people, underscoring the weight of given actors in structuring discourse.  
President Clinton recognized this importance in a statement released following Özal’s 
death, noting, “He crafted a new regional role for his country, stressing always the 
importance of democracy, trade, and peace.  The alliance of Turkey and the U.S. is 
stronger today because of the personal leadership of the late President” (1993). With 
this brief statement Clinton highlights both the personal importance of Özal in Turkey’s 
changing role while also further underscoring the connection between “democracy, 
trade, and peace” simply by tying them together as what he, and thereby the U.S. 
interprets as the three key components of the Özal legacy (1993). 
The unpopular Gulf War had hit Turkey hard economically, and the liberalization Özal 
had pushed through lacked sufficient foundation to allow for a quick rebound. The 
adverse affects on the Turkish economy were amplified by the perceived disconnect 
between the Turkish people and the structural changes put in place, as the Turkish 
market was becoming increasingly internationalized. In 1994, American leaders listed 
Turkey as one of the ten biggest emerging markets, encouraging American investors to 
become involved in the construction of the multiple natural gas and oil pipelines 
underway (Akyüz 2000: 2). With the aid of Department of Commerce restructuring in 
order to increase exports, overall trade volume between the two nations increased by 
70% between 1991 and 1997 (Ayküz 2000: 3). From the American perspective, 
economic investment in Turkey was key to ensuring its Western orientation, no longer 
against the expansion of Communism, but instead against the ideological threat of 
radical Islamism as well as the dangers generated by unstable nations in the 
surrounding regions of the Balkans, Caucuses, and Central Asia (Prager 2003: 6). This 
understanding was open and explicit, thereby strongly upholding the governing 
statements solidified during the Cold War of Turkey as a buffer and an asset to 
American interests, even if the strategies and perceived dangers were shifting. 
In his 1997 inaugural address, Clinton focuses almost exclusively on domestic issues, 
shifting his discourse to highlight the importance of government in society, employing 
the word “government” itself ten times, while saying the name “America” an 
overwhelming eleven times, and the adjective “strong” five times. Conversely, he 
utters neither “alliance” nor “ally,” and uses “free” only three times and “freedom” just 
twice.  In reflecting upon what has changed over the past decade, Clinton states:  
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“The world is no longer divided into two hostile camps.  Instead, now we are building 
bonds with nations that once were our adversaries.  Growing connections of commerce 
and culture give us a chance to lift the fortunes and spirits of people the world over.  
And for the very first time in all of history, more people on this planet live under 
democracy than dictatorship.” (Clinton 1997) 
With this statement, Clinton stresses the importance of commerce in forging 
international ties, but he does not directly equate a free market with freedom, nor 
does he tie a concept of democracy with an American conception of being free.  Only a 
few sentences later, however, he says, “We will stand mighty for peace and freedom 
and maintain a strong defense against terror and destruction” (Clinton 1997). With this 
assertion he is implicitly connecting freedom to democracy and peace, but removing 
the economic element.  Instead, he is introducing the joint concepts of “terror and 
destruction” as elements against which the U.S. must defend itself.  This new 
orientation of anti-terror would come to permeate political discourse for decades to 
come, figuring prominently into the U.S.-Turkish alliance.   
Another key concept developed during Clinton’s second term in office was that of 
democracy promotion.  Following the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, 
each American president is required annually to submit an overview of their vision of 
national security strategy (NSS) to Congress, as a means of promoting greater 
cooperation between the two branches of government (Snider 1995). These NSS 
reports do not offer specific outlines of presidential foreign policy intentions, but rather 
a broad overview of the president’s understanding of what is most important and how 
it should be broadly addressed. As such, these documents can offer key insight into 
ongoing discourse in the realm of foreign policy and how it relates to changing 
conceptions of security.  President Clinton’s 1996 NSS report was the first to include a 
full section related to the concept of democracy promotion, in which he explains that, 
“This is not a democratic crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment to see freedom take 
hold where it will help us most” (White House 1996: 32). While the concept of the U.S. 
endorsing its particular understanding of democracy around the globe dates back to 
the ideas of Woodrow Wilson, the more contemporary perspective on what this meant 
was in flux after the Cold War (Nautré 2010: 63). Clinton’s understanding of 
democracy promotion as a movement based in serving American interests helps 
anchor both his policies of selected intervention (in Bosnia and Somalia, but not 
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Rwanda, for instance) and the U.S.’s weaker criticism of Turkey’s ongoing human 
rights issues as compared to the harsh critique coming from much of Europe. Yet, 
Clinton was also a very strong proponent of multilateralism, maintaining that even the 
U.S. must not push its own agenda unilaterally but instead work within multinational 
structures, such as the UN and NATO. Although this idea was well received by leaders 
across the world, it was also criticized as simply a veiled attempt to crystalize 
American interests within international structures (Han 2010: 80). 
With continued instability in other areas of Turkey’s broader neighborhood, including in 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, as well as in other nations across the Middle East, Turkey extended 
its military alliance beyond just the U.S. and NATO, forging an unprecedented 
partnership with the fellow Western-oriented nation of Israel.  After having upgraded 
their alliance to the ambassadorial level in 1992, Turkey signed numerous bilateral 
military agreements with Israel throughout the 1990s, collaborating also on issues of 
counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing (Inbar 2011: 3). This partnership boosted 
the discourse that Turkey was situating itself with the broader West after the Cold War, 
while also allowing the Turkish military to receive equipment and funds for its ongoing 
campaign against the PKK, some of which the U.S. was hesitant to publicly offer due to 
known human rights abuses in the continuing battle in southeastern Turkey 
(Abramowitz 2003: 90). The newly founded Turkish-Israeli alliance was not viewed 
positively in much of the Arab world, but created a boost for U.S.-Turkish relations by 
constructing a stronger link between two of the most prominent Western allies in the 
region.  The development of this relationship underscored Turkey’s image as pragmatic 
and strategic, while also helping to maintain a positive image in the minds of American 
officials. Furthermore, this relationship reiterated the isolationist tendencies of Turkey 
toward its Arab neighbors, as a strong alliance with Israel is widely perceived as a 
contemptuous act in terms of relations with the other nations of the Middle East. 
When PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was first expelled from Syria in 1998 then captured 
in 1999, it seemed that the boosted military onslaught had proved effective. Many saw 
Öcalan’s arrest as the end to the Kurdish problem, and the imprisoned leader’s 
announcement of an indefinite ceasefire in August 1999 signaled this to be true 
(Abramowitz 2003: 91). Leaders in the U.S. touted the ceasefire as an anti-terror 
victory, and used this as a key issue, along with Turkey’s bourgeoning economic 
market, in pressuring the EU to put Turkey on the list of candidate countries at the 
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1999 Helsinki summit, after its exclusion from candidacy in Luxembourg in 1997 (Gillis 
2004: 2). It was following the Luxembourg summit that President Clinton met with 
Prime Minister Yılmaz, outlining a five-part plan towards further bilateral cooperation.  
The plan focused on the areas of energy, the economy, security, enhanced regional 
cooperation, and conflicts in the Aegean and on Cyprus (Prager 2003: 8). While this 
plan boosted U.S.-Turkish relations, a clearly stated goal was the strategic American 
interest of keeping Turkey in close alliance with nations of the West.  To this end, 
Clinton publicized this plan as further evidence that Turkey should be considered for EU 
candidacy. The dual focus on economic and anti-terror issues marked a distinctive shift 
as strategic relations broadened between the U.S. and Turkey by the end of the 1990s.  
But even as the alliance strengthened, the balance of power remained skewed and the 
underlying discourse of anticipated partnership to uphold American economic and 
tactical interests remained evident.  
Three months after the highly destructive Marmara earthquake in August 1999, Bill 
Clinton visited Turkey and gave an address before the Grand National Assembly, 
setting precedent as the first American president to do so (Han 2010: 91). Clinton 
stated that the American-Turkish “friendship does not depend upon a common concern 
with the Soviet Union,” but instead was now based on a changing “strategic 
partnership” (Clinton 1999 quoted in Han 2010: 91). Clinton’s actions and statements 
confirmed for Turkish leaders that in the decade since the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the subsequent break up of the Soviet Union, Turkish efforts had not been in vain in 
terms of solidifying an ongoing alliance with the U.S.  This explicit naming of the 
relationship as “strategic” on both sides of the alliance was also a clear move away 
from the decades long understanding laid out in the 1980 DECA agreement of a 
relationship based on “Turkish needs and U.S. interests” (Couloumbis 1983: 153).  
This shift in concrete statements reflects the changing nature of geopolitics in the 
1990s as compared to prior decades, and Clinton’s interest in spreading neoliberal 
economics in conjunction with humanitarian ideals. The president’s rhetoric was 
backed up by the signing of a bi-lateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 
(TIFA) that same year, concretizing the enhanced trade relationship just as American 
aid was starkly reduced (Migdalovitz 2010: 51). The shift in the levels of aid versus 
trade marked an important turning point in American-Turkish relations, chipping away 
at the reiterated balance of power based on a dominant, paternalistic America and 
implementing the structures for further integration in trade and investment. 
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During a press briefing in March, 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Marc Grossman 
underscored the strategic partnership notion, saying that the American “agenda with 
Turkey is focused on security, prosperity and democracy” (2000). He went on to 
outline the strategic importance of Turkey to the U.S., detailing Turkey’s role as a 
stabilizer in the Balkans and with Iran and Iraq, highlighting its expanding economy 
prior to the 1999 earthquake, and finally stating that: 
“Yes, we do see Turkey as a model for the Muslim world.  Turkey is a country that is 
simultaneously secular, democratic, and Islamic.  How Turks deal with that balance is 
their business, but it certainly is in the interest of the U.S. and Europe.  Our objective 
in Turkey is to make it a success because it is important to the United States.” 
(Grossman 2000) 
With this succinct statement, Grossman has put forth Turkey as a model for the region 
while simultaneously remarking that how the components of such a model are 
achieved are not important to the U.S., instead focusing solely on their outcome.  Such 
a stance firmly follows the decades-long discourse surrounding the U.S.-Turkish 
relationship, namely that as long as American strategic interests are being met then 
Turkey can do as it pleases.  While democracy promotion was a new component of 
these interests, Grossman’s words make clear that truly flourishing democracy is not 
the aim of the American alliance, but instead simply a democracy open enough to be 
counted as a “success” in American geostrategic terms. This idea fits the framework of 
Clinton’s broader foreign policy, in which American strategic interests dictated 
decisions and humanitarian involvement was still tied to the neoliberal policies first put 
forth under Reagan. However, the importance of promoting Turkey as a model should 
not be undervalued, as this statement marks a stark change in the American 
understanding of Turkey’s possible role in the region, foretelling the words of Obama 
over a decade later.   
3.5 G.W. Bush: Freedom and the War on Terror  
George Bush was elected in 2000 on a platform dominated by domestic issues, with 
foreign policy being relegated to second rung, focusing only on matters such as arms 
control and reformed relations with rising powers like India and China. He spoke little 
of the Middle East or the ideas of democracy promotion laid out by his predecessor, 
since this issue, at the time, was seen as one tied to the liberal idealism of President 
Clinton and President Carter before him (Nautré 2010: 59). Bush criticized Clinton’s 
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“activist” foreign policy, stating in a 1999 speech that unlike what had been witnessed 
in the 1990s, he would not allow America to “move from crisis to crisis like a cork in a 
current” (Bush 1999 quoted in Nautré 2010: 60). When contrasting such rhetoric 
against actions taken later on in his presidency, the great importance of context in 
discourse creation becomes overwhelmingly clear. During his inaugural address, given 
on January 20th, 2001, Bush spoke largely of the need to reform domestic policy, such 
as the school system and Social Security. Throughout the speech he neither refers to 
any specific platform nor particular incidents, waxing instead about how the strength of 
God influences the American spirit, for instance as he states that, “his purpose is 
achieved in our duty” (Bush 2001). Such a strong invocation of God presages the 
values-based policy that Bush would maintain, promoting a novel type of discourse 
openly combining American conservative ideals with evangelical Christian morals. This 
style of conservatism was dubbed neoconservatism, and is also characterized by a 
belief in American exceptionalism, endorsing the idea that only the specific 
understanding of Christian democracy heralded by American conservatives is laudable 
and worthy of promotion (Jackson/ Towle 2006: 28). While Bush did not believe in 
Clinton-style interventionism, he also shied away from the isolationism being pushed 
by some conservatives at the time (Nautré 2010: 60). Without going into detail, Bush 
promotes his neoconservative understanding for the necessity of continued American 
engagement around the globe, stating, “If our country does not lead the cause of 
freedom, it will not be led” (2001). This statement marks one of only five uses of the 
word “freedom” in his speech, and parallels the other usages in which no direct links 
are given to offer a definition, instead constructing the idea that freedom is something 
inherently American, which cannot be effectively wielded or promoted by any other 
nation.  
In the second section of his address, Bush turns to the general issue of foreign policy, 
stating: 
“We will build our defenses beyond challenge, lest the weakness invite challenge.  We 
will confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century is spared new 
horrors.  The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America 
remains engaged in the world, by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power 
that favors freedom.” (Bush 2001) 
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With this passage, Bush directly invokes the realist security dilemma, unquestioningly 
granting it weight as an argument for American engagement in the broader world.  
Yet, he is also outlining his forthcoming policies based on the idea of bandwagoning, 
an assumption anchored in the idea that if one nation gains extreme unilateral power 
then other smaller states will inevitably ally themselves in order to avoid destruction 
(Williams/ Schmidt 2007: 6). His invocation of the “enemies of liberty” sets the stage 
for discourse used after the September 11th attacks, with such black and white 
language as the backbone of what would come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. In 
the sentences following this passage he further references American values, tying 
them to the protection of interests. He says, “We will defend our allies and our 
interests.  We will show purpose without arrogance.  We will meet aggression and bad 
faith with resolve and strength.  And to all nations, we will speak for the values that 
gave our Nation birth” (Bush 2001). With this statement, Bush binds his concept of 
American values with the defense of interests and allies, thereby outlining the 
neoconservative idea that a moral compass guides American policy and creating a 
framework for a normativized linkage between values and interests. This 
understanding of America’s role in the world allowed for a promotion of unilateral 
policies that took little notice of the interests of other nations, since American interests 
were seen as superior to all others. In this way, Bush’s actions and words represent a 
change in discourse from prior presidents, but did not prompt a change of discourse 
concerning particular relationships such as that with Turkey, as strategic interests were 
still the main element guiding decision-making.  
Shortly after giving this address, Bush was faced with his first major decision regarding 
the U.S. relationship with Turkey, as the Turkish Republic fell into its worst economic 
recession since its founding.  While Bush had been intent on ending the Clinton-era 
IMF bailouts, he relented due to the severity of the economic crisis facing Turkey, 
signing on to a $31 billion IMF and World Bank package (Prager 2003: 10). Later in 
2001 Turkey appointed Princeton educated former World Bank employee Kemal Derviş 
as its new Minister of Economics, solidifying the position of American influence in 
Turkish economic restructuring. By furthering and reforming many of the policies put in 
place by Özal in the 1980s and 90s, Derviş slowed the staggeringly high inflation rate 
and pulled Turkey back from the brink of complete economic collapse (Uzgel 2002). At 
the G7 summit in Geneva in July 2001, Bush said of the Turkish restructurings, “We 
commend these efforts and encourage the continued implementation of their reform 
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programs in close collaboration with the IMF and other relevant international financial 
institutions” (2001a). By highlighting the Turkish case in particular, Bush underscored 
the perceived importance of international involvement within the Turkish market as 
well as the quick return to stable economic functioning. 
In September of 2001, the course of Bush’s presidency took an abrupt and drastic turn 
after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. All other interests and issues 
became secondary to the national security strategy, moving foreign policy from 
background to number one priority on Bush’s agenda. On the evening of September 
11th, 2001, Bush gave a televised address, opening his speech by saying, “Today our 
fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of 
deliberate and deadly terrorist attacks. … Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by 
evil, despicable acts of terror” (2001b). This statement offered a first iteration of the 
discourse that would be laid out in the following years, based on a neoconservative 
dichotomy between the value of American freedom and the evil of so-called terror, 
with a strict line separating allies on one side and enemies on the other.  Bush and 
other political figures rapidly assembled a thorough discourse of national security, 
basing all policy decisions around the constructed idea that the U.S. was immediately 
engaged in a moral war against a vague enemy set to destroy the American “way of 
life” (Bush 2001b). Along the lines of good vs. evil nations, Turkey was highlighted as 
a member of the allied camp, as Press Secretary Ari Fleischer pointed out in a briefing 
ten days after the attacks.  Fleischer noted: 
The President this morning spoke with Turkish President Sezer. The President and 
President Sezer affirmed their solidarity in the fight against terrorism and all those who 
support and harbor them. The President expressed his thanks to Turkey, a Muslim 
country, and NATO, that has long suffered terrorism, for its strong support. The 
Presidents agree that Turkey and the U.S. will work together in the long struggle 
ahead (2001). 
By specifically underscoring that Turkey is a NATO member and a majority Muslim 
country, as well as the fact that Turkey has faced terrorism in the past, Fleischer 
highlights both Turkey’s strategic advantages as an ally while also referencing a 
cultural aspect without having to delve into any interests or specifics concerning the 
Turkish people. By using the term terrorism multiple times and in reference to both the 
PKK as well as the theoretical threat of future terrorism against the U.S., Fleischer 
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linked American and Turkish goals, making an assumption of the far-reaching temporal 
nature of the partnership within this particular campaign. 
The same year, Turkish foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoğlu published his seminal 
work Strategic Depth1. Davutoğlu would become foreign minister in 2009, but his 
influence in Turkish political and military functioning dates back much earlier, and he 
rocketed to worldwide prominence with this particular book’s publication.  In Strategic 
Depth, Davutoğlu outlines a “multidirectional strategic vision” for Turkey, arguing that 
the nation should more freely follow its own path rather than adhering to “global 
designs” (Migdalovitz 2010: 2). He famously stated that Turkey ought to strive for 
“zero problems with its neighbors”, sketching four key ways to achieve this: through a 
focus on security, political dialogue, economic interdependence, and greater 
integration across the Turkic and Arab cultures (Migdalovitz 2010: 2). This orientation 
marked a distinct shift from the longstanding policy of looking to Europe and the U.S. 
for ties while keeping an isolationist distance, if not confrontational stance, in regard to 
neighbors such as Syria and Iran or even Egypt.  Davutoğlu argued that close alliances 
solely with the Western powers will “bring about a strategic submissiveness”, which 
must be circumvented by becoming a regional leader (Han 2010: 100).    
Yet, while Bush was speaking in sweeping terms of Us vs. Them, Davutoğlu was laying 
the groundwork for a more nuanced, multilateral approach to both domestic and 
foreign relations, which in fact included stronger ties to neighboring countries without 
letting go of the alliances already in place.  He advocated strongly against ideas of 
American exceptionalism without arguing against the U.S. itself, claiming that moving 
beyond the Judeo-Christian dominated world order would allow for “civilizational 
vivacity” rather than the fundamental clash outlined by theorists such as Samuel 
Huntington or Francis Fukuyama (Reynolds 2012: 13). Davutoğlu’s outlook and policy 
proposals question the inherent nature of Turkey as a Western power, referencing the 
Ottoman past and chipping away at the permanency of the nation-state model. In this 
way, Davutoğlu destabilizes the realist-based worldview still dominant with so many 
political actors, as he looks at Turkey and its relationships from a perspective allowing 
dynamic change and fluid relationships rather than an adherence to what he argues is 
                                                             
 
1 This book has not yet been translated into English, so all analysis and quotations come from secondary literature. 
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a false linearity.  This trend within Turkey directly clashed with the Bush Doctrine, 
which simply did not allow room for nuance or dialogue, instead solely viewing 
relationships from a strategic, black and white perspective. 
Yet, despite these clashing understandings of the world order, Turkish Prime Minister 
Ecevit made no move towards retreating from Turkey’s relationship with the U.S., 
ensuring the broader public that stronger regional partnerships were burgeoning in 
addition to, not instead of ties to the U.S., NATO, and Europe. This stance was put to 
the test when a U.S.-led NATO alliance began an aerial assault of Afghanistan in 
response to the September 11th attacks in early October of the same year. The 
Turkish parliament granted full war powers to the government, meaning that Turkish 
soldiers could enter combat and Turkish soil was open to foreign troops (Uzgel 2002).  
Prime Minister Ecevit visited Washington in December 2001, prior to which Bush’s 
press secretary stated that, “Turkey’s strong offers of assistance during Operation 
Enduring Freedom have underscored the vibrancy of our strategic partnership” (Bush 
2001b). This statement acts as a reminder of the assumption of an alliance from the 
American side, while also highlighting the continued strategic basis for that 
partnership. The use of the word “vibrancy” indicates diversity, when in fact Bush was 
praising only the Turkish commitment to military cooperation.  During his visit to the 
White House, Prime Minister Ecevit made clear that although he granted full support to 
the retaliation in Afghanistan, he was not in support of a further invasion into Iraq 
(Uzgel 2002). In response to a reporter’s question concerning Bush’s expectations 
from Turkey in regard to Iraq, Bush stated, “Turkey is an ally and a friend, and no 
decisions have been made beyond the first theater. And the first theater is 
Afghanistan, and I do appreciate very much the Turkish support for our efforts in 
Afghanistan” (2002). The presumptive use of “first” and “second” already indicates a 
plan for further military engagement, and Bush’s evasive answer regarding a lack of 
decisions indicates that any upcoming choices in the future are in fact solely in his 
hands, yielding little to no weight to the interests or opinions of Turkey and its leaders.  
Such language reflects Bush’s neoconservative posture, foreshadowing the most 
predominant act of American exceptionalism, namely the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
In November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won a strong victory in 
Turkey’s parliament.  Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who had been banned from politics after 
reciting a religious poem while Mayor of Istanbul in 1997, became prime minister as 
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soon as the ban was lifted, with Sezer maintaining his post as president.  The AKP was 
borne of the ashes of Virtue Party, which split after its outlaw in 2001, with the more 
conservative Islamist members forming the Felicity Party and those with social 
conservative tendencies creating the AKP. In response to overwhelming discussion 
concerning the Islamic nature of the AKP, Erdoğan stated, “We are not an Islamic 
party, and we also refuse labels such as Muslim democrat” (Erdoğan 2005, quoted in 
Taşpınar 2012). However, Erdoğan relied on a strong base of support from traditionally 
conservative central Anatolia, and once in office it became apparent that he wished to 
expand upon Davutoğlu’s ideas laid out in Strategic Depth – broadening regional 
relations, including across the Muslim world, while also maintaining strong ties to 
traditional allies.  Erdoğan appointed Davutoğlu as his chief policy advisor in 2003 and 
quickly pushed through a slew of regional changes, creating visa-free travel and trade 
zones with neighboring countries from Syria to Greece to Russia, thereby fostering 
dialogue and closer relations with nations that had long been hostile neighbors 
(Reynolds 2012: 15).   
Erdoğan also made an official visit to the U.S. during his first weeks in office, strongly 
underscoring his commitment to the American alliance and his continued interest 
therein.  Erdoğan and Bush held a press conference prior to their meeting, which Bush 
opened by stating: 
“Mr. Chairman, welcome to the home of one of your country’s best friends and allies. … 
We thank you very much for your commitment to democracy and freedom. We join 
you, side by side, in your desire to become a member of the EU.  We appreciate your 
friendship in NATO.  You’re a strategic ally and friend of the U.S., and we look forward 
to working with you to keep the peace.” (2002a) 
The first words of this statement are highly revealing concerning Bush’s understanding 
of the U.S.-Turkish relationship – he distinctly refrains from saying that Turkey is a 
best friend and ally of the United States, instead formulating an awkward sentence 
that highlights his idea that the U.S. is a best friend of Turkey’s. By then continuing to 
thank Erdoğan for his commitment to democracy and freedom, Bush ties these 
concepts to American authority by once again reiterating the subject/object formation, 
with the U.S. in a position to dole out praise or condemnation over the governmental 
actions of other nations. Finally, the mention of only the EU, NATO, and the strategic, 
peace-keeping nature of the relationship gives a strong outline of Bush’s interests from 
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the Turkish partnership, making no mention of cultural or economic relations and 
thereby underscoring the imbalanced, American interest-based alliance. Such language 
fits neatly into the framework of neoconservative American exceptionalism guiding 
Bush era discourse. 
Perhaps the greatest test to the U.S.-Turkish partnership to date came the following 
year when the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted no on March 1st, 2003 to 
allowing American troops to use Turkey for launching a northern opening into Iraq 
during the impending war. Ecevit had made his stance clear concerning a second war 
in Iraq, but Erdoğan did not make strong statements in either direction, allowing 
American officials to assume a forthcoming “yes” vote based on the track record of 
Turkish military support.  Therefore, despite a lack of Turkish interest in taking part in 
what was to be an American-led “coalition of the willing,” it came as an outright shock 
to people around the globe when Turkey refused to allow the American military use of 
Turkish soil for their invasion. This decision, while following the letter of Davutoğlu’s 
urgings to show strength against Western powers, was also deeply based in fears 
concerning the Kurdish population in Iraq, which had built up an autonomous region 
following the 1991 invasion. Turks feared that a second American war in Iraq would 
allow for even greater Kurdish autonomy, potentially creating threats to Turkish 
territorial integrity. Turkish politicians also felt that the U.S. lacked sufficient concern 
for this issue, making clear the divergence of interests tying the two nations together 
(Migdalovitz 2010: 6). The vote was quite close, however, and many argued that the 
lack of a mandate indicated a changing tide in the power of the Turkish military, as 
many top officials had in fact supported the American usage of Turkey for the northern 
front (Kapsis 2006: 3). Rather than acknowledging the numerous domestic reasons 
behind this vote, however, analysts and policy makers alike thundered about its 
significance in terms of Turkey’s growing eastward allegiance, with paternalist fears of 
“losing Turkey” being widely discussed (i.e. Minon/ Wimbush 2007). 
During a press conference about the forthcoming war in Iraq, Bush was asked if 
Turkey’s parliamentary decision would affect U.S. support for their bid toward EU 
accession, for which Erdoğan was strongly pushing. The mere asking of this question 
exhibits an underlying assumption that the American relationship with Turkey was still 
based on the U.S. getting what it wants from Turkey and only then offering its support, 
regardless of the causal reasoning behind Turkish actions.  However, Bush responded 
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by saying, “I support Turkey going into the EU.  Turkey is a friend.  They’re a NATO 
ally. We will continue to work with Turkey” (2003). This concise answer once again 
highlights the key areas structuring Bush’s understanding of the U.S.-Turkish alliance, 
showing that while there may have been hostility concerning the choices of Turkish 
political actors, Bush was not intent to drastically shift the American side of the 
relationship, but instead to keep them as a potential strategic partner for the future.   
The image of the U.S. was further tarnished in the eyes of the Turkish public later in 
2003, when American soldiers arrested eleven Turkish special forces officers in the 
northern Iraqi city of Sulaymaniya on grounds of a suspected assassination attempt 
against a local Kurdish politician. It was not the arrest per se which made headlines, 
however, but rather the manner in which it was undertaken, with the Turkish officers 
being hooded and roughly led away for questioning by American soldiers (Grigoriadis 
2010: 58). The mishandling of the Turkish citizens was seen as a direct affront to the 
nation itself, putting on display the American disregard for basic human dignity in the 
name of Bush’s War on Terror. In a 2004 Pew survey, a mere 3% of Turks said they 
had confidence in President Bush, marking the lowest level of all the fifteen countries 
surveyed (Grigoriadis 2010: 58). This distrust of President Bush combined with vocal 
disdain for the American presence in Iraq led to strong anti-Americanism in general, 
highlighting the intense interconnectedness of political actors’ personal discourse, 
structural choices, and the nation associated with them. 
In his second inaugural address following reelection in 2004, Bush mentions neither 
ongoing American war in specific terms, instead filling his speech with neoconservative 
rhetoric concerning American exceptionalism and the importance of democracy 
promotion. He does so, however, with only one usage of the word “democracy,” while 
uttering the word “freedom” an overwhelming 25 times and its counterparts “free” 7 
times and “liberty” 15 times. The stark contrast from his first speech four years prior 
reflects the strong turn in strategic discourse, shifting the emphasis entirely away from 
domestic affairs to focus solely on building a foundation around his particular foreign 
policy choices. Yet, though Bush changed course away from internal issues, his 
discourse makes quite clear how deeply intertwined American domestic and foreign 
policy actually are, as they are built off of a shared discourse of values and interests.  
Towards the beginning of his speech Bush states: 
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“We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in 
our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope 
for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. America’s vital 
interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.” (2005) 
With this statement Bush has called upon American exceptionalism to the extreme. He 
once again connects American values and interests, while also stating that the ongoing 
nature of America as it is depends on American-led democracy promotion in other 
nations. Such a claim grants weight to the overwhelmingly unpopular invasion of Iraq, 
as it is viewed as one such necessary component of Bush’s plan to promote freedom 
abroad to ensure freedom at home. Bush goes on to say, “The difficulty of the task is 
no excuse for avoiding it.  America’s influence is not unlimited, but fortunately for the 
oppressed, America’s influence is considerable and we will use it confidently in 
freedom’s cause” (2005).  This declaration once again takes the paternalistic tone used 
when Bush thanked Erdoğan for Turkey’s democracy – he is granting an intrinsic 
nature to the quality of freedom in the U.S. and the assumption that people around the 
world ought to be grateful if influenced by it.  In the next paragraph Bush states, “We 
will persistently clarify the choice before every ruler and every nation, the moral choice 
between oppression, which is always wrong, and freedom, which is eternally right” 
(2005). Here he once again uses black and white language to point out the anticipated 
confusion of other (presumably Middle Eastern) nations in the face of something he 
sees as unquestionably clear to Americans, creating a framework of seemingly simple 
and straightforward democracy promotion based on the assumption that when given 
the freedom to choose, people across the globe would choose American-style 
democracy. 
This type of broad-reaching concrete statement concerning the intrinsic goodness of 
America and the evil at work in other nations had a strong effect not only on Bush’s 
policy choices, but also on the perception of America around the globe.  According to 
Pew Global Attitudes Project, 52% of Turks surveyed held a favorable view of the 
United States in 2000, which then took an astounding fall to 15% after the start of the 
Iraq War in 2003, then diving even further to 12% by 2006 (2012). These numbers 
reflect global trends, juxtaposing Bush’s brash statements of American virtuosity with 
the negative image held across the world.  This type of reaction was in direct 
opposition to what many neoconservatives openly anticipated before entering into war 
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in Iraq, as made clear by the statements from prominent contemporary theorists 
Robert Kagan and William Kristol who claimed that “once Iraq and Turkey – two of the 
three most important Middle Eastern powers – are both in the pro-western camp, there 
is a reasonable chance that smaller powers might decide to jump on the bandwagon” 
(2003, quoted in Williams/ Schmidt, 2007: 6). This statement reiterates the belief that 
the American-Turkish relationship was one in which the U.S. could count on Turkey to 
follow its will, lacking any acknowledgement of either the fluidity of relations or the 
autonomy of Turkish decision makers. Moreover, this sentiment underscores the vast 
disconnect between the concepts held by neoconservative leadership with real-world 
outcomes, highlighting the danger of creating policy based solely on personal belief 
and singular theory. 
In the early years of the war in Iraq, Bush broadened his tactics, spearheading 
numerous policies across the Middle East in the name of democracy promotion, such as 
the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Middle East Free Trade Initiative 
(MEFTA), the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), and the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) (Nautré 2010: 94-97). These programs 
focused primarily on civil society and economic issues, based largely on the idea that 
higher per-capita incomes and a more involved and organized society would create the 
right circumstances for democracy to naturally flourish. In 2006, Turkish and American 
leaders published a document entitled “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to 
Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership,” which was based on the “global 
objectives” such as the “promotion of peace, democracy, freedom and prosperity” (Han 
2010: 93). This document, in line with the slew of other initiatives focusing on the 
broader Middle East, was not actually signed or put into official practice by leadership 
from either nation, thus making it a piece of purely empty rhetoric.  Furthermore, after 
the elections in 2006 in Egypt and the Palestinian Territories brought to power the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, respectively, many of the programs listed above 
began to fall by the wayside and American discourse concerning democracy promotion 
started to fade. The underlying idea that, given the choice, people around the world 
would choose American-style democracy was proven to be false in the case of 
Palestine and Egypt, and the surprise and disdain exhibited by Bush and other officials 
belied the American desire to promote only democracy that is tied to American 
interests, rather than truly open democracy that might result in the election of leaders 
who hold conflicting points of view.   
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Erdoğan, who was reelected in another landslide victory in 2007, was acutely aware of 
the unpopularity of the American leadership amongst Turks. Yet, the type of 
democracy that had been outlined in theoretical terms by American officials was 
coming to fruition in many ways inside Turkey. After Turkey officially gained EU 
candidate status in 1999 it began implementing the Copenhagen criteria for accession 
through such acts as abolishing the death penalty, officially allowing the Kurdish 
language to be used in public broadcasts, and fostering a greater recognition of civil 
society (Ulusoy 2010: 72). Such reforms, which resulted in an overwhelming seven 
legislative reform packages, along with the broadening of relations with surrounding 
nations, were aptly dubbed the Democratic Opening (Albright, Hadley and Cook 2012: 
14). In ways strikingly similar to the Bush administration, Erdoğan and other AKP 
leaders were basing both domestic and foreign policy on certain ideals concerning their 
particular understandings of the role of their respective country.  In both Turkey and 
the U.S., such ideals were linked to a set of values derived to some degree from 
religious belief, but also from a faith that each nation was destined to maintain 
regional or global prominence. The ways in which these values were translated into 
policy, however, varied starkly, creating potential fault lines as Erdoğan promoted 
pragmatism and Bush maintained a strong neoconservative “with us or against us” 
attitude (i.e. Bush 2002b). 
Despite the substantial domestic advances made in line with the Copenhagen criteria, 
EU accession negotiations had stalled in 2005, leaving Turkey in a position in which a 
broadening of economic and strategic ties with other nations was quite logical. To 
Bush, however, Turkey’s “fraternization” with a nation such as Iran, which he had 
glibly listed as a member of an “Axis of Evil” in 2002 (Jackson and Towle 2006: 47), 
was in direct opposition to the maintained understanding that Turkey was an 
inherently Western country with interests aligned with those of the U.S.  This was 
made clear in a statement given in 2006 after Erdoğan had once again visited 
Washington.  Bush opened his remarks by saying that the two leaders had, “talked 
about our determined efforts to fight terror and extremism. We talked about our 
common efforts to bring stability to the Middle East” (2006). Without pointing to 
specific endeavors, Bush placed Turkey in line with American strategy as he referred to 
“common efforts”.  He went on to note, “I made it very clear to the Prime Minister, I 
think it’s in the U.S. interests that Turkey join the European Union” (Bush 2006).  By 
placing these phrases back to back, Bush has once again highlighted the strategic 
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point of view taken in regard to America’s relationship with Turkey, openly stating that 
he appreciates joint military efforts and would like to see Turkey join the EU not for its 
own benefit, but because accession would be of interest to the United States. 
By 2008, however, EU negotiations remained stagnated and Russia had eclipsed 
Germany to become Turkey’s largest trading partner (Parris 2008: 7). The step away 
from a focus on economic ties with the U.S., which had been built up under Clinton, 
shifted Turkey solidly back to a role of solely strategic partner for the U.S., despite the 
fact that the Turkish economy was growing at a rate of over 6% a year between 2002 
and 2007 and Turkey’s regional prominence was still on the rise (Albright/ Hadley/ 
Cook 2012: 18). After the South Ossetia War broke out between Russian and Georgian 
forces in 2008, Turkey drafted a proposal for a Caucuses discussion forum that would 
exclude U.S. involvement. Turkey also sponsored comprehensive peace talks between 
Syria and Israel in 2008, for which the U.S. publicly acknowledged its support, 
underscoring the idea that this sort of regional involvement was in line with U.S. 
interests. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan was invited to visit the State 
Department for the first time that year, and he and Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice offered remarks to the press, in which Secretary Rice opened by acknowledging 
his visit, stating, “It is really a great pleasure to welcome you here, Ali, because I 
believe that despite all of our meetings, this is actually your first time in the 
Department of State” (2008). With this statement Rice inadvertently acknowledges the 
lack of diplomatic communication between the two nations.  Secretary Rice went on to 
describe the range of issues discussed during the Foreign Minister’s visit, all of which 
were of a strategic nature, including Iraq and Afghanistan, Israel and Syria. Rice 
commended Turkey for its work in brokering peace talks, highlighting the fact that the 
U.S. and Turkey share communal values behind such talks. She states, “those values 
are of democracy, a strong belief that the rights of individuals to freedom are 
unassailable and that they are rights that are universal” (Rice 2008).   
The same year, Erdoğan hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, forging a 
deeper relationship over such issues as trade and the continued PKK aggression, a 
topic to which many felt the U.S. had turned a blind eye (Parris 2008: 8). While Rice 
had praised Turkey’s involvement with Syria and Israel, American officials still viewed 
Erdoğan’s policy of broad regional involvement as in direct opposition to the Bush 
Doctrine of clear-cut good and evil nations.  However, the pragmatic style of building 
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strategic alliances on grounds of common national interests closely mirrored the realist 
tendencies displayed for decades by previous American leaders. Therefore, while many 
American critics feared that Turkey was turning its back on the West in the face of EU 
rejection and broadened regional connections, the U.S. was in fact failing to 
acknowledge the changing nature of the Turkish nation, thereby inducing tension at all 
levels of the relationship. This rigid binary of static and pandering partner versus evil 
enemy thereby precluded the nuanced consideration necessary for a strong alliance, 
instead reverting to a uni-dimensional dynamic based solely on American interests at a 
time when a diversified Turkey warranted greater recognition rather than vague 
disinterest or outright derision.   
3.6 Obama: Pragmatic Communitarianism  
By the time Bush left office in 2008, the effects of his presidency and the choices he 
made while in power were felt the world over.  Euphoria concerning the election of 
Barack Obama was widespread, and the Turkish public vocally supported him as a 
harbinger of change in the realm of foreign policy, particularly toward the Middle East 
(Grigoriadis 2010: 59). When Obama visited Turkey in April 2009, he addressed the 
depth and breadth of the U.S.-Turkish relationship in words beyond any uttered during 
the eight years prior, noting concisely that, “The U.S. and Turkey have not always 
agreed on every issue, and that’s to be expected – no two nations do” (Obama 2009a).  
With this brief statement, Obama upended the basic premise of the Bush Doctrine, 
namely that you are either “with us or against us,” which had effectively precluded any 
room for flexible alliance in the face of disagreement.  Before speaking to the Turkish 
Parliament, Obama and President Gül held a press conference, during which Obama 
succinctly stated, “I think, despite some of the problems that we saw beginning in 
2003, that you have seen steady improvement between U.S.-Turkish relations.  I don’t 
think they ever deteriorated so far that we ceased to be friends and allies” (2009b).  
Obama then went on to say: 
“I think that where there’s the most promise of building stronger U.S.-Turkish relations 
is in the recognition that Turkey and the U.S. can build a model partnership in which a 
predominantly Christian nation and a predominantly Muslim nation, a Western nation 
and a nation that straddles two continents – that we can create a modern international 
community that is respectful, that is secure, that is prosperous that there are not 
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tensions – inevitable tensions between cultures, which I think is extraordinarily 
important.” (2009b) 
With this statement Obama addresses Huntington’s idea of civilizational clash, 
contending instead that nations can maintain and promote harmonious relations across 
religious and cultural lines rather than succombing to some sort of inevitable conflict.  
By directly addressing both the bump in the alliance in 2003 and the understanding 
that geography and religion should not preclude close relations, Obama is further 
countering Bush era discourse, laying groundwork for a sharp shift in U.S.-Turkish 
relations situated within a broader shift in both domestic and foreign policy discourse.  
Moreover, by introducing the idea of a “model partnership,” Obama has moved firmly 
beyond the rhetoric of a strategic alliance, creating room for building upon precisely 
how the U.S. understands and promotes this new step in the relationship.  Davutoğlu, 
who was appointed Foreign Minister in 2009, responded to this new label in a speech 
delivered in June of 2009 titled “Turkey-U.S. Relations: A Model Partnership, Global 
and Regional Dimensions”.  After going through the specific geostrategic histories of 
each nation and detailing why they prompt parallel interest in a wide range of issues, 
Davutoğlu states: 
“This model partnership is not a matter of choice, it is a matter of necessity.  We 
should sit together, establish all the contacts at every level from political leadership to 
the lowest rank of diplomats and work together.  This should be the new 
understanding.  This is the political side: multidimensionality.” (2009) 
By promoting such a strong and specific endorsement of the new understanding of 
Turkish-American relations as a model partnership, Davutoğlu is declaring his 
pragmatic interest in bringing this vision to fruition through an expanded alliance.  
Davutoğlu states the word “necessity” in reference to both sides of the relationship, 
thereby engaging language used during the Cold War to describe Turkish reliance on 
the U.S. while upending this connotation to promote an understanding of mutual need. 
In his speech to the Turkish Grand National Assembly that April, Obama outlined the 
many challenges facing the contemporary world, from war to poverty to energy 
scarcity, stating, “This much is certain: No one nation can confront these challenges 
alone, and all nations have a stake in overcoming them” (2009a). While such 
sentiment may seem self-evident, its utterance in fact works to further scale back the 
Bush era idea of American exceptionalism and the aggressive push to spread so-called 
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American values the world over, presaging Davutoğlu’s suggestion that many nations 
around the world should work together on common strategic interests.  The President 
then reiterated the longstanding American support for Turkey’s EU membership, 
though instead of arguing for it as a boon for American interests he says, “Europe 
gains by the diversity of ethnicity, tradition and faith – it is not diminished by it. And 
Turkish membership would broaden and strengthen Europe’s foundation once more” 
(Obama 2009a). Here Obama is addressing an oft unspoken question regarding why 
the EU is hesitant to accept Turkey into its midst, stating plainly his stance in 
opposition to any underlying Islamaphobia or fears of Turkey as culturally apart from 
the rest of Europe.  Finally, Obama states that: 
“I know that there have been difficulties these last few years.  I know that the trust 
that binds the U.S. and Turkey has been strained, and I know that strain is shared in 
many places where the Muslim faith is practiced.  So let me say this as clearly as I 
can: The United States is not, and will never be, at war with Islam.” (2009a) 
With this statement, Obama both tacitly acknowledges the role that individual actors 
play in shaping relationships by granting weight to the decisions made during the Bush 
era, while also specifically pointing out the tensions that were generated across the 
Muslim world.  By once again answering an unasked question – namely whether or not 
the U.S. is at war with Islam – Obama has offered substance to the perception that 
this could be true, thereby acknowledging his own empathy for such a perspective and 
creating a space for dialogue. With his emphatic assurance that the U.S. is not 
engaging in such a war, however, Obama once again pulls away from the values-based 
rhetoric inspired by the moralistic Bush Doctrine, laying the foundation for a new 
discourse based on more malleable terms of alliance, explicit room for discussion, and 
a recognition of others’ interests within mutual relationships.  
Each of these principles contributes to the theorist James Kloppenberg’s description of 
Obama as philosophical pragmatist, meaning that he is guided by an urge to maintain 
a stable community, potentially at the global level, while acknowledging the lack of any 
set of universal truths (Leeman 2012: 4). Kloppenberg notes that Obama’s particular 
rhetorical style offers much broader substance than that of either his predecessor or 
many of his peers, prompting people the world over to comment on his eloquence 
while also feeling a sense of identification with the content of his words. In this way, 
Obama embraced the power of discourse with a high level of awareness, recognizing 
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the influence of his own language while also noting the crucial significance of 
interpretation and reiteration of relationships, thereby engaging a constructed, 
historicist perspective on international relations. This type of stance in regard to 
discourse as well as to policy-making sets Obama apart from prior American 
presidents, as his pragmatism overturns the model of strict exceptionalism built up by 
neoconservatives without reverting to a realist position, instead seeking collaboration 
and communal understanding while recognizing the inevitability of conflicting opinions.  
He does not contradict the underlying principles of free-market liberalism heralded by 
leaders such as Reagan or Clinton, though his unambiguous communitarian rhetoric 
moves a step beyond Clinton’s humanitarian-based philosophy. While this standpoint 
by no means indicates that Obama’s policies will always follow these ideals, it is 
important to recognize the stark shift in baseline understanding of international as well 
as basic human affairs, particularly between the Bush and Obama administrations, as it 
further highlights the great importance of individual actors and how their personal 
philosophies can influences broader structures. 
In his inaugural address, given on January 20th, 2009, a few months before his first 
visit to Turkey, Obama directly addressed the change in strategy between his 
predecessor and himself, stating, “On this day, we come to proclaim an end to the 
petty grievances and false promises, the recriminations and worn-out dogmas that for 
far too long have strangled our politics” (2009). He goes on to say, “In reaffirming the 
greatness of our Nation, we understand that greatness is never a given” (Obama 
2009).  With these words, Obama explicitly acknowledges the fluid nature of power 
and international relationships, implicitly referencing the myopic assumptions of 
American greatness tendered under Bush. Obama then addresses the economic 
downturn, prompting the nation once again to overcome differences in order to 
address such pressing issues.  When he comes to his discussion of foreign policy, 
Obama says: 
“Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with 
missiles and tanks but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions.  They 
understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we 
please.  Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use.  Our 
security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the 
tempering qualities of humility and restraint.” (2009) 
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Here Obama explicitly derides both the power balancing strategies endorsed during the 
time of the realist security dilemma as well as the Bush era bandwagoning, instead 
highlighting once more the importance of strong alliances and a tempered approach.  
Throughout his speech Obama uses the word “freedom” only three times and “free” 
only twice, focusing more on a specific discussion of issues, including both the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, rather than on broader platitudes (2009). 
During Obama’s initial visit overseas, he strongly promoted the fostering of both old 
and new relationships. After visiting Turkey in April, he went to Egypt in June, giving 
what quickly became an historic speech at Cairo University. In this address, Obama 
derided both extremism and widespread hostility on all sides of the spectrum, saying, 
“I’ve come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the U.S. and Muslims 
around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect and one based on 
the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition” 
(2009c).  He followed by stating that, “I do so recognizing that change cannot happen 
overnight” (Obama 2009c). Here Obama is acknowledging the harm done by the good 
vs. evil rhetoric of his predecessor while asking for a chance to build something more 
positive in its stead. Later in the speech he addressed specificities regarding how this 
might be achieved, pointing out strategic, economic, and cultural areas for 
collaboration and improvement. By visiting both Ankara and Cairo so early on in his 
presidency and by laying out so explicitly his interest in moving relationships beyond 
the dichotomous lines drawn under Bush, Obama set the stage for an expanded 
foreign policy embracing broader engagement while potentially also moving beyond 
the humanitarian-based model created under President Clinton in the 1990s. 
In December of 2009, Prime Minister Erdoğan made his first visit to the White House 
during the Obama administration. Following their meeting, the two leaders gave a 
press conference, during which Obama stated: 
“Over all, just to summarize, I am incredibly optimistic about the prospect of stronger 
and stronger ties between the U.S. and Turkey that will be based not only on our NATO 
relationship, our military-to-military relationship, our strategic relationship, but also 
increasing economic ties.” (2009d) 
By explicitly stating that he would like to strengthen both the traditional and the 
economic ties between the two countries, Obama reiterated his desire to move beyond 
the solely strategic alliance. Erdoğan responded by saying: 
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“The fact that the President visited Turkey on his first visit overseas and that he 
described and characterized Turkish-U.S. relations as a model partnership has been 
very important for us politically and in the process that we all look forward to in the 
future as well.” (Obama 2009d) 
This response underscores the significance of Obama’s choice of words in his 
discourse, highlighting the importance of the concrete shift from strategic to model 
partnership.  In response to a question concerning the PKK in Iraq and Turkey, Obama 
stated: 
“I think that the steps that the Prime Minister has taken in being inclusive towards the 
Kurdish community in Turkey is very helpful, because one of the things we understand 
is, is that terrorism cannot just be dealt with militarily; there is also social and political 
components to it that have to be recognized.” (2009d) 
With this statement the president has gone beyond the discourse of any of his 
predecessors in the contemporary era, explicitly noting the perceived importance of 
internal cultural functioning in Turkey. Moreover, he is plainly recognizing that 
terrorism has causes that cannot be squelched solely through military power, thereby 
acknowledging the significance of ongoing human relationships in the construction and 
reiteration of power dynamics. 
After heightened positive relations in 2009, 2010 proved a very difficult year for the 
U.S.-Turkish alliance, as events both within Turkey and across the region gave direct 
test to Obama’s proclamation that allies must not agree on every issue in order to 
maintain strong relations. In May of that year, Erdoğan signed an agreement with 
Brazilian President Lula da Silva and Iranian President Ahmadinejad, whereby Brazil 
and Turkey agreed to accept part of Iran’s low-enriched uranium in exchange for 
enough higher-enriched uranium to fuel a research reactor (Inbar 2011: 8). This deal 
took place amidst American and UN pressure for greater sanctions against Iran in 
order to stifle their potential development of nuclear weapons. Rather than publicly 
admonishing Turkey for acting outside the realm of U.S. interests, however, Obama 
personally called Erdoğan, acknowledging the potential importance of the Turkish deal 
while stating his own belief that diplomacy had not proved successful in the past with 
Ahmadinejad, meaning that sanctions were likely the best route to a non-nuclear Iran 
(Obama 2010). This type of presidential discourse follows Obama’s rhetoric concerning 
an interest in personal dialogue, resituating the interpersonal power relationship as 
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one in which each party is recognizing the actions and interests of the other, even in 
the face of disagreement. 
In June 2010, the UN Security Council voted on a U.S.-sponsored resolution to impose 
a new round of sanctions against Iran, which Turkey and Brazil both voted against, 
while even China and Russia gave unprecedented support (Cagaptay 2011: 5).  
Erdoğan stood by his position of diplomacy, openly referencing his trust in 
Ahmadinejad, who he had referred to in late 2009 as a “close friend” (Cagaptay 2011: 
5). With this stance, Erdoğan was challenging the American and broader international 
view that Ahmadinejad could not to be trusted and that his desire to create and 
potentially use nuclear weapons could only be dissuaded with the force of sanctions, if 
not military intervention. Erdoğan had argued during his November 2008 trip to 
Washington that nations such as the U.S. ought to dismantle their own enormous 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons before playing world police against countries like Iran 
(Cagaptay 2011: 5). This statement, backed up by his actions in 2010, highlight the 
changing nature of U.S.-Turkish relations, as Erdoğan was not only forging ties 
elsewhere but also openly acting against the policies promoted by the U.S. on the 
world stage, while also pointing out the hypocrisy of American actions, thereby shifting 
the structural balance of power and furthering the schism in the previously held notion 
of Turkey as a largely tacit partner. Erdoğan did all of this while still maintaining close 
ties with the U.S., thereby acting upon his desire for broadened relations while also 
operating under the assumption that contradictory actions would not prompt a cutting 
of ties with the U.S. It is the American reaction to Erdoğan’s actions that reflects the 
U.S. understanding of the relationship, however, and Obama’s personal engagement 
and continued support for broadened relations with Turkey reflect a change on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 
In the midst of the Iran debate, Turkey’s relationship with Israel was strongly put to 
the test when a humanitarian flotilla headed for Gaza was raided by Israeli soldiers, 
resulting in the death of nine Turkish activists (Albright, Hadley, and Cook 2012: 45).  
Erdoğan and other Turkish leaders, such as Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, responded 
harshly both to the attack and to the general response of the U.S. and other nations.  
Davutoğlu called the incident “Turkey’s 9/11,” and suggested Turkey cut diplomatic 
ties with Israel immediately (Cagaptay 2011:5). While the flotilla raid prompted 
extreme public discord, relations between Turkey and Israel had already begun to sour 
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the year before. After the 2008-2009 Gaza war, Erdoğan abandoned his previous 
efforts to act as a mediator between both Israel and Syria as well as between Fatah 
and Hamas. He walked out of the World Economic Forum summit in Davos in 2009 
after a lively disagreement with Israeli President Shimon Peres, and later that year he 
recalled Israel’s invitation to participate in the “Anatolian Eagle” air exercise (Inbar 
2011: 1). Throughout 2009, Obama failed to make strong public comment on any of 
the changes to the Turkish-Israeli relationship.  When Press Secretary Robert Gibbs 
was asked about the President’s personal response to the flotilla raid during a June 
2010 press conference, Gibbs reiterated three times that Obama’s condemnation of 
Israeli actions were in line with those of the UN Security Council, but that further 
comment could only be made following a thorough investigation (Gibbs 2010). This 
hesitation shows Obama’s interest in remaining neutral and in line with the broader 
community rather than creating heightened tension with either Israel or Turkey. In this 
way, although Obama did not give the strong response that Erdoğan and other Turkish 
leaders were hoping for, his silence in fact indicates a measured respect for the 
American alliance with both Israel and Turkey, which marks a distinct shift from the 
historical tendency to place Israeli relations above any others in the region. 
The ensuing UN investigation of the so-called Mavi Marmara flotilla incident, which 
resulted in the Palmer Report, concluded that it was within Israel’s jurisdiction to 
attempt to stop the flotilla of ships from breaking the blockade of Gaza, but 
condemned the specific nature of their actions. Israel took this conclusion as grounds 
for maintaining silence in the face of Turkey’s demand for an apology, in response to 
which Turkey downgraded diplomatic relations to the level of second secretary 
(Albright/ Hadley/ Cook 2012: 45). This action was accompanied by a dismantling of 
much of the joint military and intelligence-sharing platforms that had been built up 
since the 1990s, thereby crumbling the strong strategic alliance between the two 
nations. In November of 2011, Vice President Joe Biden visited Turkey, prior to which a 
press conference was held with his press secretary, who stated, “The bottom line is 
that improved relations between Turkey and Israel would be good for Turkey, good for 
Israel and good for the U.S. and indeed good for the region and the world” (Obama 
2011a). This statement elucidates the basic discourse promoted by the Obama 
administration – pragmatism with recognition of the interests in all parties involved.  
However, as Erdoğan and Davutoğlu continued to deepen Turkey’s engagement with 
the Arab nations of the region, it became highly dubious as to whether or not they 
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viewed restored relations with Israel as “good for Turkey,” and it became clear that 
they were not going to mend fences simply to pander to American wishes. 
Another issue that came to a head in 2010 was the American labeling of the 1915 
Armenian massacre as genocide. Following the “zero problems” doctrine, Turkey had 
made unprecedented efforts towards normalized relations with Armenia during 2009, 
culminating in the establishment of diplomatic relations in October of that year (Kirişci/ 
Tocci/ Walker 2010: 11).  Relations faltered quickly, however, when neither side 
agreed to ratify the proposed protocol until the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh territory 
dispute with Azerbaijan was resolved (Zanotti 2012: 27). In March 2010, U.S. 
Congress voted on a resolution to recognize the killing of Armenians under Ottoman 
authority in 1915 as genocide, a move that prompted Turkey to recall its ambassador 
for one month.  The bill did not pass, however, just as previous bills of a similar nature 
had caused discord between the two nations without ever becoming law (Zanotti 2012: 
27).  On Armenian Remembrance Day the following month, Obama referred to “one of 
the worst atrocities of the 20th century,” but refrained from using the word “genocide” 
(2010). Moreover, he stated, “I am encouraged by the dialog among Turks and 
Armenians, and within Turkey itself … the Turkish and Armenian people will be 
stronger as they acknowledge their common history and recognize their common 
humanity” (Obama 2010). By stressing communitarian values and praising the use of 
dialogue to resolve longstanding conflict, Obama strayed from the discourse of former 
presidents, particularly that of President Reagan, who had openly condemned the 
“genocide of the Armenians” in 1981 (quoted in Zanotti 2012: 38). Though Obama had 
in fact given support for genocide recognition when he was a U.S. Senator, his careful 
choice of language as President reflects not only his underlying recognition of the 
power of discourse but also his acknowledgement of the Turkish side of the issue.   
Despite the numerous causes of tension in 2010, both administrations continued to 
promote a strengthening of U.S.-Turkish relations on numerous levels, with the basis 
of the relationship built on ongoing back and forth dialogue. In September of that year, 
Assistant Secretary of State Phillip Gordon underscored the importance of such 
communication when he remarked, “There’s not a government in Europe with which 
we have more ongoing and open dialogue than with the government of Turkey” 
(quoted in Migdalovitz 2010: 47). With this statement, Gordon made a concrete 
connection between the relationships the U.S. has with Turkey and with other 




GET MA WP 07/2014 
European countries, reiterating that communication is the foundational basis of such an 
alliance. The strong interest in broadened relations was further concretized with the 
mutual signing of the 2006 “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the 
Turkish American Partnership” document, giving weight to what had seemed only 
empty rhetoric when first proposed under President Bush. This document lays out 
specific means for dialogue in the areas of defense, economic cooperation, trade and 
investment, and civil engagement.  It also calls for a “high level review” of the alliance 
by Undersecretaries on an annual basis and “regular contact” between the American 
Secretary of State and the Turkish Foreign Minister (Embassy of the United States 
2006), directly following the guidelines of the suggestion made by Davutoğlu the year 
before. The ratification of this document created a structural basis for the 
intersubjective relationship of officials on multiple levels, setting the stage for even 
closer involvement and ongoing dialogue. 
In January 2011, Assistant Secretary of State Jose Fernandez gave an address at a 
business summit in Istanbul, where he reiterated that “Turkey and the U.S. share a 
very unique and special relationship, which is truly a ‘model partnership’” (Fernandez 
2011). He went on to say, “This is not some vague and idealistic vision of unity and 
harmony.  It is in fact a realistic assessment based on the substantive steps we have 
already taken” (Fernandez 2011). By addressing the issue of rhetoric versus 
substantive discourse, Fernandez is setting apart the contemporary U.S.-Turkish 
relationship from times past, backing up Obama’s words by noting that concrete steps 
had been taken towards closer relations. By acknowledging that the alliance is unique 
in the same breath as supporting the idea of it as a model, Fernandez is indicating that 
the concept of “model partnership” is not understood in reference to the specific 
elements of each nation, but instead to the nature of their ongoing relationship, 
marked by its fluidity and strength even in the face of disagreement or difficulty.  This 
supports Davutoğlu’s suggestion that overlapping interests and history lay the 
foundation but only dialogue and a close interaction between actors on all levels can 
really build meaning behind the idea of a model.  Moreover, such a concept of a model 
partnership falls in line with the idea of Obama as a communitarian pragmatist, 
granting recognition to the importance of both the close personal relationships 
between actors in each country as well as the structural ties, while also accepting 
disagreements or difficulties within the alliance. 
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The same month that Fernandez gave this address, mass uprisings were spreading 
across the Middle East, with overwhelming numbers of protestors in nations from Libya 
to Yemen to Egypt expressing their outrage against long-existing structural inequalities 
and dictatorial regimes. These protests, along with the subsequent toppling of the 
authoritarian leaders in Tunisia and Egypt and broader conflicts in Libya and later 
Syria, led to an unprecedented degree of possibility for Turkish involvement in the 
region while also highlighting the question of how the U.S.-Turkish alliance should be 
understood and promoted.  Turkey was quick to give public recognition to the protest 
movements, and Erdoğan was the first foreign leader to openly call for Mubarak’s 
ouster in Egypt (Ustun 2012: 4). Such a stance surprised some, as Turkey had worked 
hard to cultivate strong relationships with leaders such as Assad and Qaddafi over the 
past decade as part of the “zero problems” doctrine. The move was viewed as 
pragmatic, boosting the view of Turkey in the eyes of many across the Middle East, 
since regardless of motivation, Erdoğan was making a statement by siding with the 
people over the regimes. While U.S. officials also gave calculated support for regime 
change in Egypt and other countries, their hesitance was clearly guided by a fear of 
rocking the boat with allies such as Saudi Arabia, who control the continued flow of oil 
from the region. In the end, Obama’s acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the 
protests and his support for the removal of dictators marked the beginning of the end 
of the “Camp David order,” in which U.S. officials offered aid and support to 
authoritarian regimes across the Middle East in exchange for their active or tacit 
acceptance of Israeli policies as well as oil security (Ustun 2012: 3). This support did 
not extend to every nation, however, with Gulf countries such as Bahrain still 
struggling under enduring monarchies. The lack of universal support for democratic 
change highlights the limits within the realm of Obama’s communitarian discourse, 
underscoring the fact that America’s strategic drive to protect the flow of oil still 
dictates key relationships in the region, overriding any personal interest Obama may 
profess in changing the nature of all diplomatic relationships to promote the will of a 
given nation’s people. 
Following a UN Security Council resolution in March 2011 calling for protection of 
Libyan civilians, a French-led force began a military intervention in Benghazi with the 
aim of stopping the violence of Qaddafi’s army (Zanotti 2011: 9). Turkey was at first 
reluctant to join the coalition, with Erdoğan pushing for a peaceful transfer of power 
following diplomatic talks with the Libyan leader. Once the intervention had begun, 
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however, Erdoğan relented and gave first diplomatic then military support, while 
expressing strong reservations concerning the planning and implementation of the 
attacks (Zanotti 2011: 9). The Turkish embassy in Tripoli remained open and became 
a base of operations for Western diplomats (Ustun 2012: 4), offering one aspect of a 
structural element of Turkish diplomatic power working outside a U.S.-dominated 
framework. The intervention proved tactically successful, as Qaddafi was overthrown in 
October 2011, though ensuing violence and instability gave credence to Turkish fears 
of an ill-planned initiative, highlighting the legitimacy of their worry about a further 
debacle along the lines of Iraq following the 2003 invasion.  While the situation in 
Libya remained unstable, the uprising in Syria was broiling over into a bloody 
crackdown at the hands of Assad’s army.  After months of intensive diplomatic efforts 
attempting to convince Assad to stop the violence and heed the demands of his people, 
Erdoğan shifted tack and joined the call for the Syrian leader’s removal.  Turkey also 
quickly became the primary destination for an ever-increasing flow of refugees 
escaping Syria.  The welcoming discourse surrounding the reception of these refugees 
underscores the multifaceted nature of changed relations between Turkey and its 
neighbors, indicating something deeper than simply high-level, realist ties. 
In the midst of the ongoing turmoil across the Arab world, American and Turkish 
diplomatic and business leaders met for an annual TIFA meeting in July 2011, during 
which representatives from the two nations discussed ways to further integrate their 
trade and investment interests.  Additionally, they planned the second meeting of the 
U.S.-Turkey Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation (FSECC), 
which was then held the following summer in Istanbul (Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative 2011). While the TIFA agreement was first signed under President 
Clinton in 1999, the FSECC represents the first systematic Cabinet-level economic 
cooperation between the two nations, marking a distinct elevation within the structure 
of U.S.-Turkish relations beyond the strategic level.  In a press release following the 
TIFA meeting, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative said, “We are working hard to fulfill 
President Obama’s commitment to enhance our bilateral trade and investment ties and 
to seek out new ways to pursue with Turkey our mutual goals in the Middle East and 
North Africa” (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 2011). This quote indicates that 
President Obama maintains a distinct interest in offering substance to his discourse in 
both the economic and cultural realms.  Such actions represent prime elements of the 
discursive shift occurring under Obama, indicating that his words were not just rhetoric 
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but are also connected to clear actions, thereby creating a full shift in governing 
statement as the way Turkey is talked about, the regularity of contact between high 
level actors, and the breadth of the relationship all began to change since Obama came 
to power. 
Although the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Turkey is no longer 
highlighted as the key element tying the two nations together, this aspect of the 
alliance gained a huge boost in September 2011, when Turkey agreed to host a NATO 
missile defense system believed to act as a counter in case of an Iranian missile attack 
on Europe.  In response to the agreement, a senior White House official told the New 
York Times that it was, “probably the biggest strategic decision between the U.S. and 
Turkey in the past 15 or 20 years” (Zanotti 2012: 22). This quote highlights the fact 
that although the alliance was dubbed “strategic” throughout the Bush years, a lack of 
bilateral initiatives in fact left the relationship devoid of much strategic output. The 
Turkish decision to host the defense system went counter to the enhanced ties being 
built up with Tehran over the past few years, and was therefore seen as a decisively 
pragmatic move in the face of diverging Turkish and Iranian responses to the Arab 
Spring, in particular over how to address the increasing violence in Syria (Ustun 2012: 
5). Yet, Turkish officials were also quite vocal regarding their demand against sharing 
defense intelligence with Israel, thereby displaying a lack of interest in returning to so-
called “linkage politics,” connecting the U.S., Israel, and Turkey.  The American and 
NATO acceptance of Turkish demands marked a clear end to the era in which 
Washington considered good relations with Israel to be a prerequisite for working with 
Turkey on regional issues, thus heightening the truly bilateral nature of U.S.-Turkish 
relations.   
Before a UN summit in New York that same month, Obama and Erdoğan gave a joint 
press conference, which Obama opened by saying, “Turkey is a NATO ally, a great 
friend and a partner on a whole host of issues … most recently symbolized by the 
agreement of Turkey to host a missile defense radar” (2011).  Erdoğan then began his 
section of the brief address by noting, “As you have described the relationship between 
Turkey and the U.S., we have a model partnership. And this is a process which is 
ongoing” (Obama 2011). With these snippets of discourse it can be seen that while 
Obama is promoting the Turkish choice to host the missile defense system, Erdoğan is 
reiterating that what makes the alliance a “model partnership” is not just a singular 
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occasion, but in fact the continued construction of the relationship, thereby 
emphasizing the importance of individual actors’ reactions to changes in material 
conditions, such as the NATO defense system, in reconstructing the ongoing 
relationship. 
While Obama acknowledges Turkey’s divergent interests and the potential motives 
behind them to a greater extent than any president before him, his administration is 
also more willing than prior American administrations to discuss issues of human rights 
abuses and authoritarian tendencies witnessed within the AKP government. For 
instance, during the press conference before Vice President Biden’s November 2011 
trip to Turkey, National Security Advisor Antony Blinken spoke about the issue of 
potential constitutional reform in Turkey to strengthen freedoms of expression and 
religion, then went on to express concern over the jailing of journalists. He then 
stated, “We have the kind of relationship with Turkey where we work very closely 
together on so many different issues across the globe, but where when we have 
disagreements we make them known in a spirit of respect” (Obama 2011a). This 
careful diplomatic language shows the interest held in maintaining close relations while 
also offering concern regarding internal issues within Turkey, something that was 
flagrantly not done under previous administrations.   
Yet, while Obama has made positive mention of the fact that Turkey is becoming more 
democratic as the stronghold of military power is slowly dismantled, he has offered 
minimal comment on the related Ergenekon case or the ongoing attack on the secular 
elite-based, so-called “deep state” in Turkey. At a rally in Kızılcahamam in early 2012, 
Erdoğan addressed the crowd, saying, “Dear friends, to be one, to be together, to walk 
together toward the same future is the biggest strength of our people.  For this reason, 
the first priority should be to eliminate those who do not want Turkey to grow, 
develop, and advance” (quoted in Filkins 2012). This sort of language alludes to the 
pervasive imprisonment of journalists, intellectuals, and others who speak against the 
AKP – more than 700 people over the past five years – as well as to the ongoing case 
against an alleged network of military and other secular elite set to topple Erdoğan’s 
government (Filkins 2012). While Obama may show definitive interest in expanding the 
American-Turkish relationship beyond the strategic realm, he has done little to directly 
engage with Erdoğan concerning the above-mentioned issues.  This omission in their 
dialogue indicates Obama’s interest in maintaining a close personal relationship 
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without giving cause for anger or a potential perception of overstepped boundaries.  
Thus, while the underlying understanding driving Obama’s discourse is starkly different 
from his predecessors, his pragmatic reasoning in relationship building still leads to 
tactical oversight in areas that are highly significant for the Turkish public and could 
prove quite important in terms of how the relationship will unfold in the future. 
Nevertheless, even in the face of certain questionably democratic actions and 
sometimes erratic behavior on the part of Erdoğan and the AKP, the idea of Turkey as 
a model nation became a hot topic following the Arab Spring.  How this concept is 
understood and promoted varies widely depending on the situation or the person 
endorsing it, but the way in which the Turkish model is understood by the Obama 
administration arguably reflects the underlying shift in broader understanding of the 
U.S.-Turkish alliance overall, as well as a more fundamental shift in policy discourse.  
Obama’s understanding of Turkey’s model status is built on the words uttered in his 
2009 speech to Turkish parliament, namely that as allies they will work together 
closely even though it is clear that they will not always agree.  Obama openly 
discussed the role of Islam in Turkey while also praising its democracy, meaning that it 
was not the strictly secular Kemalist and relatively tacit Turkey that he viewed as a 
model, but rather the pragmatic Turkey that has gained its current status under the 
AKP. It is clear from his ongoing personal relationship with Erdoğan that Obama values 
the Turkish leader himself, but a lack of specific praise regarding the AKP as a party 
also allows room for the possibility of a continued close relationship in the face of a 
power change within Turkey, thereby recognizing the fluidity of power relations and 
the need for adaptability depending on fluctuations in context.   
Obama has made explicit mention of the fact that the domestic and foreign policy 
choices made by Turkish leadership will not always align with U.S. interests and has 
made it clear that he does not view such alignment as a prerequisite for close 
relations. In many ways, this type of alliance most closely mirrors those the U.S. 
maintains with prominent Western European nations such as France or Germany, 
indicating that it is this sort of pragmatic partnership that Obama also seeks from the 
emerging democracies across the Middle East, therefore signifying a strong break from 
the paradigm of past relationships.  For instance, when Mohammed Morsi was elected 
President of Egypt in June 2012, Obama personally called to congratulate him, noting 
that he hoped for a close relationship in the future (Obama 2012). This move was in 
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stark opposition to Bush’s dissolving discourse of democracy promotion in Egypt 
following the election of Muslim Brotherhood members in 2006, further underscoring 
the base-level discursive change seen under Obama.   
Obama was reelected in November 2012 amidst continued horrific violence in Syria, 
long-term instability in Iraq, unresolved issues surrounding nuclear energy in Iran, and 
myriad other ongoing issues throughout the Middle East, Europe, and across the globe.  
Two days following his reelection, Obama personally telephoned 12 world leaders to 
thank them for their support.  Erdoğan was among those called, preceding Prime 
Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom (Obama 2012a). This gesture once again 
indicates Obama’s interest in maintaining close relations with Erdoğan and with the 
Turkish nation in general, particularly at a time when the relationship could be 
geostrategically helpful in terms of addressing the many ongoing issues in the region.  
Some have argued that such pragmatic reasoning is the sole factor behind American 
interest in the ongoing alliance with Turkey, yet when looking back over the decades 
this argument quickly falls flat.  Obama has made repeatedly clear through both words 
and actions that his interest in expanding relations with Turkey are neither restricted 
by nor entirely reliant upon events within the broader region, thereby breaking starkly 
from the discourse of past American leaders.  Moreover, Turkey also offered strong 
geostrategic advantages throughout the Bush era, but following 2003 Bush did little to 
strengthen the American relationship with the rising Turkish power, thereby 
underscoring the importance of the discourse of individual actors in shaping 
relationships. Yet, the enhanced and expanded relationship with Turkey does not 
represent a singular shift in discourse, but is in fact situated within a broader change 
away from strict realist paradigms towards more communitarian alliances.  While 
Obama still faces the myriad pressures affecting any American president, through both 
verbal and structural acts he has consistently displayed a desire to forge a new era in 
global politics, shifting the overall understanding of the American role in the world and 
therewith prompting robust changes within individual alliances.  
4. Conclusion 
Since its inception as an academic discipline in the 20th century, international relations 
has focused on the analysis of interactions and power relationships between states.  
For decades, the bulk of this research was guided by realist theory, which also heavily 
influenced the decisions of political actors during the Cold War and beyond. While 
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realism undeniably still plays an influential role in shaping relations amongst actors, 
structures, and states, the discipline of international relations has evolved to recognize 
that it is no longer the only game in town.  Moreover, even if realist principles shape 
the decisions being made in certain circles, this fact does not necessitate a realist 
analysis of those decisions and their effects.  The use of constructivism allows for an 
examination of the discourse surrounding decisions and actions, breaking down the 
motivations and cyclical effects between structures and actors.  By engaging in a 
constructivist analysis throughout this thesis, the American understanding of foreign 
policy broadly and its relationship with Turkey specifically were outlined and analyzed, 
building a framework to highlight the shift in governing discourse witnessed under 
President Obama.  Through the use of this specific frame of analysis, it was shown that 
not only was there a marked change in political actions and structures between Obama 
and Bush, but also between Obama and prior presidents, as his communitarian 
discourse varies sharply from anything that came before.  While not all of Obama’s 
policies necessarily reflect this shift, the careful analysis of discourse in this thesis 
revealed both wider foreign policy changes as well as a fundamental change to the 
U.S.-Turkish alliance, thereby upholding the hypotheses laid out in the introduction.  
Throughout the Cold War, Turkey’s relationship to the U.S. was built around its 
position as a buffer zone between the USSR and Europe.  During the 1990s, Clinton 
expanded the American relationship with Turkey as part of his broader interest in the 
changing role of formerly third world nations, while Özal also aggressively sought 
positive relations through economic reform.  During the eight years of the George W. 
Bush administration, however, despite a heightened geostrategic importance of Turkey 
as Bush initiated wars in two Middle Eastern countries and engaged in the so-called 
War on Terror, the Turkish-American alliance stagnated.  Although many cite the 2003 
Turkish parliamentary decision against the U.S. usage of Turkish soil for a northern 
assault into Iraq as the impetus for a weakened American-Turkish relationship in the 
first decade of the new millennium, the analysis of high-level discourse undertaken in 
this thesis makes clear that, in fact, culpability laid more succinctly with political actors 
on the American side. Though political and societal dynamics within Turkey were 
indeed in flux, the moralistic, black and white worldview promoted by President Bush 
impeded a full evaluation of these changes and an concomitant adjustment of 
relations, instead reverting back to a type of partnership more closely mirroring that 
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maintained under President Reagan or other previous leaders, when Turkey was seen 
as a strategic ally solely called upon for fulfilling American regional interests.  
Therefore, while geostrategic reasoning unquestionably acts as a motivating factor 
pushing Obama to seek a positive relationship with Turkey, without his personal 
philosophical framework guiding both interpersonal and structural choices, it cannot be 
taken for granted that the alliance would have been strengthened.  For this reason, 
when analysts worry about the U.S. “losing Turkey”, they ought to first remember that 
no relationship is ever inevitable or static, and secondly dig a bit deeper to include the 
plethora of aspects contained within a given alliance, realizing, as Obama did, that 
embracing a nation while also recognizing its right to act independently might be the 
best road to strengthened, ongoing ties.  Drawing on this analysis, the idea of Turkey 
as a model nation for emerging democracies across the region is based not on the 
specific components of the contemporary or historical Turkish nation, but rather on the 
current level of pragmatic, dialogue-based policy on display in Ankara.  Further, while 
Obama has openly disagreed with certain choices and actions taken under the AKP, he 
continues to promote the notion of model partnership between the U.S. and Turkey, 
thereby giving strength to his underlying philosophy of communitarianism and 
pragmatic alliances that are no longer solely contingent upon the dominant partner’s 
interests. The promotion of this partnership further works to endorse such alliances 
across the region, which, if realized, would mean a sea change in the overall U.S. 
relationship with the Middle East. 
Yet, while no relationship is ever static, some contexts and conditions are more 
conducive to rapidly changing alliances than others.  Such conditions are in place right 
now across the post-Arab Spring Middle East, with ongoing conflict in Syria and new 
leaders such as Egypt’s Morsi flexing power in unprecedented and unexpected ways.  
With Syria and Iran no longer backing Hamas in Palestine, Turkey has taken a position 
alongside Egypt and Qatar as a main ally to the group, which is still viewed as a 
terrorist organization by the U.S. government. Additionally, Turkey’s once important 
role as a mediator with Israel has disintegrated, as was evidenced by their lack of sway 
during the recent November 2012 conflict in Gaza.  Within this context, Turkey’s role in 
the region will continue changing at a rapid pace, as will that of the U.S.  Moreover, 
questions of human rights abuses and the role of the Kurdish minority are as pressing 
as ever in Turkey today, and will inevitably have an effect on both domestic and 
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foreign policy. Therefore, it is clear that the internal workings of both the U.S. and 
Turkey as well as their stances across the Middle East and the globe will in turn affect 
the way that the two nations interact with each other, as ongoing discourse continues 
to build and rebuild the active alliance.   
As such, while this thesis highlighted the discursive change witnessed under Obama, it 
does not intend to argue that such a change will lead to a fixed and stagnant 
relationship.  In fact, the analysis undertaken in this thesis underscored the fluid 
nature of American foreign policy perspectives and the understanding of its 
relationship toward Turkey, thereby indicating that these stances will continue to grow 
and change. The highly divergent discourse analyzed in this thesis emphasizes the 
importance of examining not only historical or contemporary ties but also the broader 
discourse of leaders when attempting to situate a given alliance.  For instance, if Mitt 
Romney had been elected president instead of Obama in November 2012, a change in 
discourse would have certainly followed, as Romney’s understanding of America’s role 
in the world differs greatly from Obama’s, thereby impacting his discursive choices.  
Yet, even in the face of changes in actors and structures as time moves forward, 
fundamental shifts in relationships are not erased, and past factors continue to 
influence current relations.  For this reason, examining the important changes that 
occurred under Obama while mapping them onto the trajectory of American discourse 
over the past decades allowed for the creation of a robust framework, making clear the 
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